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4. INTRODUCTION  
Many countries are struggling to limit greenhouse gas emissions and focus on 
carbon-free energy sources, and therefore nuclear energy is a subject of con-
tinuing debate to enhance the worldwide energy production mix and cover the 
base load requirements. This debate about nuclear energy has spurred the 
development of a wide range of forecasts and computational models of the 
uranium (U) requirement to fuel the ongoing growth of nuclear power. 
Evaluation of uranium supply in a market and resource optimization context is 
needed to inform decisions impacting the long-term development of nuclear 
power and warn policy makers about possible uranium market supply-side 
volatilities and to help choose the technology mix. The aim of this work is to 
demonstrate and test advanced simulation methods and conceptual ideas to 
enable realistic fuel cycle simulators and develop a supporting tool for decision 
makers. Additionally, this work facilitates the selection of the most favorable 
nuclear fuel cycle, using optimization with respect to multiple criteria to save 
natural resources, minimize the impact of high level radioactive waste on 
nature, and decrease nuclear material proliferation risks.  
The nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) is a complex system which involves physical 
and chemical initial metal transmutation and energy production in nuclear 
reactors. Due to high levels of remaining radioactivity in a spent nuclear fuel 
(SF), the time delay effect must be taken into account between processing steps. 
Currently there are about 440 nuclear power plants worldwide, which operate in 
31 countries. More than 61 reactors are under construction. Operation period of 
a nuclear reactor can reach up to 60 years, therefore it is important to ensure 
nuclear fuel supply in entire operation period. Current yearly natural uranium 
(NU) demand reaches up to 63 000 tons of uranium from mines, and each newly 
built reactor will require annually additional 150 tons of uranium. Nuclear 
reactors are designed to run on a specific nuclear fuel, which cannot be substi-
tuted in a short period and any changes requires large investments. Therefore, 
fuel requirements must be satisfied in a short run (World Nuclear Association, 
2017). 
Currently mainly all commodities are being traded in an organized commodity 
exchange market which is opposite to NU market. The uranium trade is based on 
fixed-long term contracts, negotiated between mines and facilities. Negotiated 
NU price can be indexed one reference price, but most likely is calculated on 
basis of various reference prices and corrections indexes. The corrections indexes 
are based on a spot market price and can have speculative effect. The statistical 
data shows, that 80% of all NU has been sold on bases of long term contracts 
and only 20% by spot market price (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014; World 
Nuclear Association, 2008; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010).  
The first part of this work models uranium market relationships based on a 
plausible assumption that in nearest future uranium will be sold based on a spot 
price and each NU producer will compete with other producers. The other part 
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of this work solves optimization paradigm to find the most favorable NFC 
which help to save natural resources, minimize high level radioactive waste 
impact on nature and decrees nuclear material proliferation risks. 
The aim of this work is to take an advantage of different modelling methods, 
for example, the agent based modelling (ABM) concept and create more realistic 
front end NFC model which allows to demonstrate, how the NFC can be 
modelled in a free market economic condition and measure uranium market price 
correlation to the different macroeconomic events. The model simulates uranium 
mines as independent entities – agents, which act based on market conditions and 
individual economic parameters to maximize profit in a given time period. An 
agent or autonomous unit concept, where each unit can independently take 
decisions and learn from overall or individually collected statistical data, allow 
to simulate large and complex systems with multiple parts supporting actions 
and interaction between entities based on the case study. However, the model 
cannot be used to predict uranium market price but rather to measure policy, 
regional level regulations and natural disasters’ effect on a uranium market price 
and NU utilization factor. Such lightweight model can be used to advice policy 
makers, can be plugged into another NFC model and can be used to test multiple 
conceptual methods. 
The initial work is based on an existing time depending front-end NFC model, 
which calculates equilibrium conditions in a uranium market taking into account 
nuclear reactors demand, NU reserves, conversion and enrichment capacity as 
well as secondary sources – depleted uranium (DU) and weapon graded 
plutonium (WGPu) (Schneider et al., 2013). The work extends the uranium 
market-clearing model by adding the ability of individual uranium mines to 
react on U market price change governed by predefined constraints such as local 
or regional regulations, natural disasters’ or other uncertainties. Such conceptual 
approach can benefit also other NFC, which depict several fuel cycle actors. 
These simulators allow realistically model the interaction of different NFC 
entities to react on market changes.  
The initial augmented market model is based on the uranium mines property 
database, which contains information about 330 uranium resources in a different 
development stages, unit production costs, total reserves and annual production 
capacity. The enhanced model version is capable to model competition between 
uranium mines considering different mines economic characteristics such as 
total overnight capital cost of construction, operation and maintenance and 
decommissioning costs. Since the simulator marches forward in time, individual 
agents (U mines) make decisions not knowing what others are doing, and de-
cisions are based only upon market conditions in the current time step and own 
historical decisions. Namely, each mine has ability to develop individual stra-
tegy and maximize profit. This gives rise to unrealistically myopic behavior for 
agents, which make decisions based only on current economic conditions or on 
past data. Therefore, was implemented ability to move back in time and allow 
the model change agent decision in past. Decision change simulates ability to 
make long term market predictions for individual agents. In such a way 
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individual agent can modify the strategy which is based on projected evolution 
of the uranium market. The model tries to find correct strategy for each agent by 
marching backward and forward in time to ensure that mines operate throughout 
their lifetime. The model also is capable to simulate unexpected market condi-
tions and the ownership change. To make operation decision which is based on 
a U market prices, the model must have U mine’s economic characteristics such 
as total overnight capital cost of construction, operation and maintenance and 
decommissioning costs. But information about individual mines economical 
characteristics are not available and rather is subjected to market secret, there-
fore, the methodology presents calculation based on available unit cost data. 
This lightweight, advanced front-end NFC model is very essential, because it is 
built on the sandbox principle, where components can be extended, replaced 
and new concepts and developed multiple scenario can be tested easily. 
An optimal backend NFC selection can ensure natural resources optimiza-
tion and nuclear waste minimization in actinides transmutation process. Based 
on objective criteria for example resource availability, electricity price, trans-
mutation policy, nuclear materials proliferation constraints and environmental 
risks it is very important to choose correct nuclear reactor technologies’ combi-
nation. In fact is possible to define any objective function which contains these 
criteria and based upon it solve optimization task. Although, in practical appli-
cations such decision-making evaluation is very difficult to achieve, because of 
the highly nonlinear nature of the constraints which are required by the time-
dependent material balance model. Therefore in this work is included section 
about optimal nuclear reactors technology mix finding, based on minimization 
of cost of electricity. The model calculates entire fuel cycle costs by using tradi-
tional present-value and levelized-cost analyses. 
To complete the above mentioned tasks current work will include two 
important sections with different nuclear fuel cycle modelling aims:  
1. Front-end nuclear fuel cycle modelling using a mine-based uranium market 
clearing model, which is based on publications II and II;  
2. An optimal fuel cycle scenery evaluation based on a nuclear fuel cycle and 
economy simulation tool’s mass equilibrium model, based on publication III. 
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5. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE OVERVIEW 
The nuclear fuel cycle is the series of industrial processes consisting from 
multiple steps and involves the production of electricity from uranium, plutonium 
and other fissile materials in nuclear power reactors. These steps accommodate 
uranium mining, uranium milling, conversion and enrichment, fuel fabrication, 
power generation and burn-up, used fuel cooling, reprocessing uranium and 
plutonium recycling, waste treatment. The full fuel cycle scheme with possible 
materials flow is presented in Figure 1. Although theoretically it is possible to 
burn transuranic elements and minor actinides only a small fraction of spent 
nuclear fuel being processed and used again in so called mixed oxide fuel 
(MOX) in the light water reactors that predominate nuclear power generation. 
The MOX nuclear reactors fuel is usually consisting of plutonium mixed with 
natural uranium, reprocessed uranium, or depleted uranium. 
 
The NFC starts with uranium mining as it is shown in Figure 1. Uranium is a 
relatively common element that is found throughout the world in earth’s crust 
and oceans, but can only be economically recovered where geological processes 
have locally increased its concentration. It is mined in a number of countries 
and must be processed and in most cases enriched before it can be used as fuel 
for a nuclear reactor. The uranium is mined in an open-pit or underground and 
then uranium is extracted from the crushed ore in a processing plant (mill) using 
chemical methods appropriate to the specific mineral form. According to the 
 
Figure 1. Nuclear fuel cycle overview and possible materials flow 
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World Nuclear Association data current usage of natural uranium is about 
63 000 tU/yr. The world’s present measured resources of uranium are 5.7 Mt in 
the cost category to 130 USD/kg U and 7.6 Mt in cost category 260 USD/kg U. 
Taking into account current natural uranium demand growth rate in 
conventional reactors, the resources in a cost category until 130 USD/kg U are 
enough for about 90 years. Further exploration, new technologies and higher 
prices will certainly, on the basis of present geological knowledge, yield further 
resources when present ones are used up (World Nuclear Association, 2016). A 
significant fraction of used fuel may be processed to recover fissile and fertile 
materials in order to provide fresh fuel for existing and future nuclear power 
plants. Such options are studied in advanced nuclear fuel cycles with fast 
neutron reactors usage.  
Natural uranium contains 0.7% of the 235U isotope and remaining 99.3% is 
238U isotope which does not contribute directly to the fission process. Only 
isotope 235U is fissile and can sustain chain reaction in light water reactors (PWR 
and BRW) and must be in defined concentration level in a nuclear fuel that is 
usually 3–5% to guaranty optimal fuel burn-up level (World Nuclear Asso-
ciation, 2017). Uranium isotopes 235U and 238U have identical chemical properties 
but different physical properties respectively their mass. The difference in mass 
between two isotopes makes it possible to increase the percentage of 235U in a 
nuclear fuel. All known enrichment technologies use the mass difference 
property. There are reactors designed to use natural uranium as a fuel, for 
example the Canadian-designed CANDU and the British MAGNOX reactors. 
The nuclear fission process releases large amounts of energy and for this 
reason fuel must be assembled to endure high operation temperatures and 
intense neutron radiation. Fuel structure need to maintain their shape and 
integrity over a period of several years to prevent the leakage of fission products 
into the reactor coolant. The standard fuel form comprises a column of ceramic 
pellets of uranium oxide, clad and sealed into zirconium alloy tubes, which 
being arranged into fuel assemblies to form regular array of cells. The fission 
process consumes fuels, therefore old fuel rods must be replaced and rearranged 
periodically to support optimal fuel burn-up and nominal thermal load in reactor 
core. For LWRs and PHWRs reactors there are three main stages in fuel 
fabrication:  
1. Producing pure uranium dioxide (UO2) from incoming uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6) or uranium trioxide (UO3). 
2. Producing high-density ceramic UO2 pellets. 
3. Producing the metal framework for the fuel assembly. 
A nuclear reactor is complex technological system which produces and 
controls the release of energy from splitting the atoms of certain elements and 
the energy released is used as heat to make steam to generate electricity. During 
nuclear reactor operation, part of the 238U is changed to plutonium in neutron 
capture reaction, and 239Pu ends up providing about one third of the energy from 
the fuel. The fuel assemblies, after being in the reactor for 3 to 6 years, are 
stored underwater for 10 to 20 years. The water serves such purposes: 
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4. Works as a shield to reduce the radiation levels 
5. It cools the fuel assemblies that continue to produce heat (called decay heat) 
for some time after removal. 
After 10 or more years, the radiation from fuel assemblies and decay heat 
levels are low enough that the fuel may be stored in large casks which can be 
cooled by air passing on the outside.  
Spent fuel management includes storage, transport, processing and recycling 
or packaging for disposal. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute data the 
nuclear industry generates a total of about 2000–2300 metric tons of used fuel 
per year. In past four decades, the entire industry has produced 76 430 metric 
tons of used nuclear fuel (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2017). Reprocessing of used 
nuclear fuel to recover uranium and plutonium allow to avoid the wastage of a 
valuable resource. Yearly reprocessing capacity in several countries is now 
about 5000 tons per year, which allow recover uranium and plutonium to use it 
in a nuclear fuel (World Nuclear Association, 2017). Theoretically reprocessing 
can be done in several courses, separating certain elements from the remainder, 
which becomes high-level waste. Reprocessing options include: 
6. U, Pu recovery (currently is done in several countries). Nowadays all com-
mercial reprocessing plants use the well-proven hydrometallurgical plutonium 
uranium extraction process (PUREX). 
7. Separate U, Pu + U (small amount of U). 
8. Separate U, Pu, minor actinides (future objective). 
9. Separate U, Pu + Np, Am + Cm (future objective). 
10. Separate U + Pu all together (future objective). 
11. Separate U, Pu + actinides, certain fission products (future objective). 
The separation process has two problems – separated plutonium causes 
potential proliferation risks and minor actinides remaining in radioactive wastes 
has longer-lived radioactivity compared with fission products. The minor 
actinides handling is technically more difficult due to high radioactivity. 
The HLW, which classified as highly radioactive and will continue to generate 
a lot of heat, contains about 3% of the used fuel in the form of fission products 
and minor actinides (notably Np, Am, Cm). It is conditioned by calcining and 
incorporation of the dry material into borosilicate glass (process called vitri-
fication), then stored in geologically safe disposal. In principle any compact, 
stable, insoluble solid is satisfactory for disposal. The LLW are safely stored on 
site or transported to licensed storage. Waste is stored until it has decayed away 
and can be disposed of as ordinary trash. The goal of an advanced nuclear fuel 
cycle which includes actinides transmutation, is to have wastes which become 
radiologically innocuous in only a few hundred years. The need for a waste 
repository is not excluded, but it can be smaller, simpler and the hazard posed 
by the disposed waste materials is greatly reduced. 
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5.1. The once-through nuclear fuel cycle 
The once-through or open nuclear fuel cycle is nowadays the predominant fuel 
cycle. The open fuel cycle consists of uranium mining and milling, conversion 
and enrichment, fuel fabrication, power generation in nuclear reactors, used fuel 
cooling and geological disposal. Historically nuclear reprocessing and plu-
tonium separation was considered to raise nuclear materials proliferation risks 
and require significant investments in technology. Also, uranium at that time 
was relatively cheap. Therefore, an open nuclear fuel cycle was considered as a 
good option. In the open fuel cycle the spent nuclear fuel is considered as a 
waste and should be encapsulated and disposed of in a deep and safe geological 
repository after several decades of interim storage for heat decay. The techno-
logy for interim storage for at least 50 years is well established. But the techno-
logy for encapsulation and disposal is most advanced in Finland and Sweden, 
where it has been developed to a stage that license applications for construction 
and operation have been led. The other countries do not have such stable soil, 
where they could store nuclear waste. Therefore the closed nuclear fuel cycle is 
very important. It will allow to optimize natural uranium consumption and 
nuclear reactors will not be so depended from uranium market price and will 
help to deal with HLW.  
 
 
5.2. Closed nuclear fuel cycle  
In the closed fuel cycle the spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed to separate uranium, 
plutonium and minor actinides for future use. Full utilization of fissile materials 
will require multiple reprocessing and recycling of successive generations of 
fuel. Also, the full nuclear fuel reprocessing cannot be achieved effectively with 
current nuclear reactors, therefore it will require development and commercial 
implementation of fast neutron reactors which can enable the extraction of 50 to 
100 times more energy from the originally mined uranium than reactors 
currently in operation (Joint Research Centre et al., 2011). The closed nuclear 
fuel cycle can include multiple reprocessing targets, these targets are:  
12. Plutonium recycling is used in several countries to produce so called MOX 
fuel, which being burned in LWRs. There are no plans to reuse recycled 
MOX fuel, because the proportion of the non-fissile even-mass isotopes of 
plutonium rises with each pass through the cycle.  
13. Minor actinides recycling.  
With a specific reactor design all the actinides in the fuel can be consumed, 
leaving only lighter elements with short half-lives. One promising alternative is 
so called accelerator-driven sub-critical reactor. Here a beam of protons or 
electrons is directed into a target. In the case of protons beam usage, very fast 
neutrons will spall off the target, meanwhile in the case of the electrons beam, 
very high energy photons will be generated. These high-energy neutrons and 
photons will then cause the fission of the heavy actinides. In Figure 2 plutonium 
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and minor actinides recycling scheme is displayed. In the cycle scheme (Figure 2) 
multi-recycling plutonium process is displayed, where the only constraint is that 
the second fuel type must always have the same initial nuclide content as the 
fresh (first generation) MOX fuel. From FRs spent nuclear fuel can be recovered 
plutonium which can be reused either as FRs or LWR fuel. The minor actinides 
cycle is separate cycle which aims into fission element transmutation. 
 
5.3. Nuclear fuel cycle costs calculation 
Nuclear fuel cycle costs can be divided into two parts. i.e., front-end components 
which include uranium purchase, conversion to uranium hexafluoride, enrichment 
and fuel fabrication, and back-end components. The back-end components 
depends from chosen strategy of fuel cycle, either it is open fuel cycle or 
partially/fully closed nuclear fuel cycle. In an open fuel cycle cost components 
include permanent waste disposal and waste processing costs (vitrification), 
meanwhile in a closed fuel cycle the plutonium separation and leftover waste 
disposal must be accounted. Different studies show, than partially or closed 
nuclear fuel cycle total costs are higher that open fuel cycle costs due to required 
infrastructure costs and additional technical processes (Technical Subcommittee 
on Nuclear Power, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 2011; Nuclear Energy Agency, 1994). 
However open fuel cycle costs analysis does not take into account future social 
 
Figure 2. Plutonium and minor actinides recycling 
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costs for HLW. The techniques to estimate total NFC costs include separate 
component analysis and cost evaluation for each element. There is no many 
reprocessing facilities or enrichment facilities in countries with advanced 
nuclear power generation technology, the nuclear fuel cycle cost data are rather 
estimated costs instead of real costs. It is very difficult to obtain relevant costs 
for each facility. Thus, the nuclear fuel cycle cost as an estimated cost is 
inevitably subject to uncertainty and calculation required probability distribution 
or also can be applied deterministic method where an input variable as a rep-
resentative value. The total cost of the nuclear fuel cycle is generally calculated 
by multiplying the process quantity in each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle 
process with the unit cost. These costs will be completely different for each 
country due to labor cost, tax etc. difference. Figures 3, 4 are show time scale 
model for each fuel cycle. It will take many years to start SF reprocessing and 
economic reason for closed nuclear fuel cycle would be NU price and HLW 
social costs. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Direct disposal model time frame 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Plutonium recycling model time frame 
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6. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE NUMERICAL MODELLING 
(BASED ON PUBLICATIONS I AND II)  
Nuclear fuel cycle is a complex system with multiple components where each 
step can add unit costs. The nuclear fuel cycle numerical models are intended to 
simulate the evolution of cycles over a period of time and then to provide output 
data relevant to the input parameters. A numerical nuclear fuel cycle modelling 
can have multiple targets (JUCHAU et. al, 2010): 
14. Analyze nuclear fuel cycle different strategies and options to help decision 
makers and calculate levelized cost of electricity for a simulation. Evaluate 
reprocessing-recycling strategies as well analyze new reactor deployment 
and existing fleet replacement.  
15. Perform an uncertainty analysis for each fuel cycle element. 
16. Uranium resource evaluation for different nuclear fuel cycle strategies and 
optimization task solving across multiple objective functions. 
17. A transport modelling to track material balance and its isotopic com-
position evaluation in every fuel cycle stage. Isotopic composition in spent 
nuclear fuel is calculated by the fuel depletion code. Detailed isotopic 
tracking, particular plutonium and minor actinides are required to address 
advanced fuel cycle viability questions, optimal resource usage and HLW 
issue analyze.  
18. Open access to simulation code and documentation.  
Currently there are many different nuclear fuel cycle simulation codes which 
fulfil one or several above mentioned technical targets but only few codes are 
reviewed in this study. In the Table 1 there are compared several NFC simu-
lation codes according to the above mentioned technical targets. Although many 
of NFC codes only partially supported one or several technical targets they are 
included in the results table. 
 
Table 1. Summary of different nuclear fuel cycles code comparison results  
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As we can see, all nuclear fuel cycle simulation codes (included in the Table 1) 
can be divided into two groups, those who track material movement in discrete 
fuel batches and those who do not. For example, the VEGAS was originally 
created at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with the aim to minimize 
TRU materials and complement other simulator. A mine-based uranium market 
clearing model is created to evaluate uranium supply effect on natural uranium 
price and demonstrate agent-based simulation concept. CAFCA performs eco-
nomic analyses for a simulation calculating the average total cost of electricity 
for a scenario and the final goal is to minimize TRU inventory of a given 
scenario. DANESS can simulate ten different reactor fuel combinations. Reactors 
and facilities are characterized by types, not individually. Material flows are 
tracked isotopically and radioactive decay is incorporated. It calculates a 
levelized cost of electricity for a scenario. VISION code is capable of modelling 
nuclear fuel cycle scenarios using multiple reactor and fuel combinations to 
calculate the levelized cost of electricity for a simulation. The code also calcu-
lates radioactive decay and tracks material flows isotopically. In the NFCSS 
reactors and fuel cycle facilities are characterized by types and cannot be added 
with individual parameters to simulation. Materials are tracked by isotopes, and 
radioactive decay is included in a simulation. The NFCSS can simulate four 
different reprocessing scenarios. 
The second group of nuclear fuel cycle modelling codes tracks material 
movement in discrete fuel batches or fuel assemblies. COSI works as engine 
which is composed of several interconnected codes, including a cycle-by-cycle 
burn-up and depletion engine. The code can be used to provide an economic 
analysis of a nuclear fuel cycle including calculations for levelized cost of 
electricity. CEPMNFC code also incorporates a cycle-by-cycle burn-up and 
depletion engine. In the code actinides are tracked at the isotopic level, while 
fission products are tracked as a group. Radioactive decay is incorporated. The 
code calculates the levelized cost of electricity for predefined scenarios. The 
GENIUS 1 code is a multi-regional simulator in which individually charac-
terized reactors and fuel cycle facilities may be included in a simulation. Also, 
materials are tracked isotopically. GENIUS 1 can be used to simulate three 
basic fuel cycle arrangements. NFCSim code was developed primarily to explore 
different fuel cycle options for the United States. There can be individually cha-
racterized deployment of reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and accelerator driven 
systems. Materials are tracked in isotopic level and radioactive decay is calcu-
lated. The code calculates a levelized cost of electricity for a modelled scenario. 
Simulation tool developers must find a balance between usefulness and cre-
dibility, because models can very easily become complex and any new simu-
lation can require significant effort as well data analysis and validation can 
become almost impossible. A lot of simulation tools work with arbitrary chosen 
data due to lack of information. 
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7. URANIUM MINING MARKET CLEARING MODEL 
This chapter will be discuss technical information about a mine-based uranium 
market clearing model, its technical characteristics and individual U mines 
decision making strategy economic background. Subchapters will provide 
depiction of individual U mine’s mining cost calculation, NU market supply 
curve creation, U demand curve creation and U market price calculation. 
 
 
7.1. Uranium mines economic characteristic calculation 
The advanced model builds upon the market clearing model of the uranium and 
enrichment industries described in (Schneider et al., 2013). That model is built 
upon databases of primary and secondary uranium resources as well as enrich-
ment facilities, with each enrichment facility having a unique cost structure. The 
model derives market-clearing conditions by locating the intersections between 
the annual supply and demand curves for uranium and enrichment services 
while also considering the effects of secondary supplies including highly 
enriched uranium down blending and sale of natural uranium inventories, which 
come for zero price. Therefore, the model incorporates the coupling between the 
uranium and enrichment markets. For instance, an increase in uranium price 
will lead to decreased tails assays, more demand for enrichment, higher enrich-
ment prices and ultimately reduced demand for natural uranium. In special con-
ditions when enrichment industry experiences NU supply shortages, enrichment 
services can guaranty short-term U market price elasticity and continuous low 
enriched uranium (LEU) supply by using DU tails assay. The short-term U 
market price elasticity can also be regulated by secondary uranium management 
policies. 
Each mine in the core database has unique characteristics including total 
uranium reserves, earliest feasible opening date, capital and operating costs and 
others detailed below and in (Schneider et al., 2013). Since these characteristics 
are fixed, the supply curve for each individual mine is also the same in every 
time period as long as the mine still possesses uranium reserves it can produce. 
Therefore, the production decisions of each mine can be determined based on 
the short-run market price, which is in turn set by the industry short run supply 
curve aggregated over all mines that are able to produce in that time period. The 
aggregated short run industry supply curve displays all uranium mines which 
can potentially produce in a given time period if the price is high enough.  
Figure 5 distinction between an individual mine “shutting down” in the short 
run and “exiting” price in the long run. Figure 5 follows the economic rules, 
which are described in (Nechyba et al., 2011). The marginal cost (MC) is the 
variable cost incurred by producing one additional unit of output. The average 
variable cost (AVC) is the average value of the MC for all units of output pro-
duced. The average total cost (ATC) is the AVC plus the amortized capital cost 
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(ACC) divided by the number of units of output. For a mine to operate, its 
economic costs must be covered either from direct NU sell in a current time 
period or from accumulated profit gained in previous periods. The MC curve 
crosses ATC at its lowest point (E1) because the MC is of producing an 
additional unit of output is averaged into the ATC. When the MC is less than the 
ATC, each new unit of output lowers the ATC. A new mine will not begin to 
operate unless its average total cost of producing uranium is less than or equal 
to the mine’s MC. This point is known as the short-run breakeven point (E1 in 
Figure 5). If a mine is currently operating it will continue to operate until the 
market price drops below the minimum value of its AVC and all accumulated 
profit will be spent to cover  U mine’s operation and annual maintenance costs. 
This is known as the long-run industry exiting point (E2).  
 
 
Figure 5. Cost curves for a single uranium mine 
 
The original model’s database does not include information about capital, ope-
ration and maintenance or decommissioning costs for individual uranium mines, 
only their unit cost of uranium production at a reference output level. Operating 
cost information is required to allow the simulator to make short run operation 
decisions, while capital costs become relevant when determining whether to 
open or decommission a mine. Disaggregated capital, operating and decommis-
sioning cost data is available from WISE Uranium Project for a limited number 
of mines (Diehl, 2011). 
One representative mine of each type – underground (UG), open pit (OP) 
and in-situ leach (ISL), is chosen from this data set. The Generation-IV Eco-
nomic Modelling Working Group (EMWG) unit cost calculation procedure is 
applied to compute unit production costs — UC ($/kg U), for these mines 
Quantity
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AVC
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(EMWG, 2007). All other mines of that type are assumed to adhere to the same 
relative distribution of capital, operating and decommissioning costs. Hence 
these costs are obtained by scaling the costs for the reference mine by the ratio 
of unit costs, as detailed below. This simplification was made in response to the 
unavailability of detailed cost structure breakdowns for individual mines. The 
representative disaggregated costs available in (Diehl, 2011) are used in this in 
order to demonstrate the implementation of the model. 
Table 2 provides the reference data set for each mine type. The methodology 
for relating TOC, OM, and DD to UC is described next. The unit cost, UC, is 
calculated as a sum of all costs components divided by total annual production 
output. In equation it can be written as: 
 
 UC = (ACC + ADD + OM)/M (1) 
 
Where M: Annual production (throughput) of product in kg of basis unit/yr: 
technology-specific basis unit may be U, separative work unit (SWU), etc. 
ADD: Amortized annual decommissioning costs. 
The unit cost components are calculated as above. The amortization factor 
(AF) is given by:  
 
 AF = r
1–(1 + r)–T0
 , (2) 
 
where r: Real discount rate, T0: Duration (years) of operation. An amortization 
factor used to determine the periodic payment amount due on a loan, based on 
the amortization process. 
A sinking fund amortization factor (SFF) with a lower rate of return applies 
to decommissioning costs. It is calculated from: 
 
 SFF = rSF
(1 + rSF)T0–1
 (3) 
 
where rSF: Real sinking fund rate, T0: Duration (years) of operation. In finance, 
a sinking fund is a method by which firm’s sets aside money over time to retire 
its indebtedness. Namely, it is a fund into which money can be deposited, so 
that over time preferred stock, debentures or stocks can be retired. Then TOC, 
interest during construction (IDC) and decommission costs (DD) are calculated 
from the reference data:  
 
 TOC = ACC × M
AF
-IDC (4) 
  
 IDC = ∑ TOC × fi × ((1 + r)Tc–j–1)Tci=1  (5) 
 
 DD = ADD
SFF
,  (6) 
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where Tc: Duration (years) of construction. Total operating costs are expenses 
associated with U mine maintenance and administration on a time basis. Interest 
costs during construction refers to the financing charges incurred during the U 
mine construction. Decommissioning cost or asset retirement obligation is the 
cost incurred by firms in reversing the modifications made to landscape when U 
mining operation is ended. 
The next step is to calculate the scaled costs for other mines of the same type 
by using economic decomposition method incorporating throughout mass scale 
approach. In the discussion that follows, variables subscripted “r” apply to the 
reference mine of a given type (OP, UG, ISL). Unsubscripted quantities apply 
to another mine of the same type. The amortized annual capital, OM and DD 
costs and interest during construction are scaled from reference values as 
follows: 
 
 ACC = UC
UCr
· ACCrM
Mr
 (7) 
  
 OM = OMr· UCUCr· MMr
 (8) 
  
 DD = ADDr· UCUCr· MMr
 (9) 
  
 IDC = IDCr· UCUCr· MMr
 (10) 
 
The OM, is interpreted as the AVC at the reference annual production level, M. 
In reality, individual mines would increase or curb production as conditions 
warranted; however, the reference existing model (Schneider et al., 2013) 
permits mines to function at their reference capacity or not at all. By formu-
lating a mine-specific supply curve, the modification described next enables 
each mine to select its own production level at every time step. 
A bottom-up engineering cost analysis would be needed to construct such a 
supply curve. Since the objective of this work is to demonstrate a method for 
making use of such data in a simulation, a plausible functional form was chosen 
to represent a generic short run supply curve, which shows the quantity supplied 
by individual U mine at certain price level. The form chosen is second order 
polynomial equation, as was proposed in (Harshbarger et al., 2009). It is and 
given by:  
 
 P = aQ2 + bQ + c, (11) 
 
where Q: supply quantity in given period (usually one year), P: marginal cost of 
supplying an additional unit at quantity Q; a, b, c: coefficients to be determined. 
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For each uranium mine, the existing database from (World Nuclear Asso-
ciation, 2008) provides a reference capacity (tons of uranium produced per year) 
and a reference production cost ($ per kilogram of uranium produced), from 
which is calculated marginal cost of supplying. Therefore, to determine the 
coefficients a, b, and c the following criteria are imposed: 
 
 ൞
P1 = aQ12 + bQ1 + c
P2 = aQ22 + bQ2 + c
0 = 2aQ2 + b 
  (12) 
 
Here Q1 and P1 are the reference capacity and cost from the database. Economic 
theory provides that a firm’s short run marginal cost curve exhibits a U shape, 
as predicted by Equations (12). The shape arises because costs per unit of pro-
duction first decrease as production rises from very low levels and scale benefits 
are realised. As additional capital and labor inputs are applied to increase pro-
duction, though, the marginal benefit of these inputs begin to decline as they 
outstrip the ability of a firm’s infrastructure to effectively use them. Although 
there exists insufficient historical mine data to calibrate the marginal cost curve, 
the U shape of Equations (12) provides the correct type of feedback to the cost 
model. The point P2 = 0.5P1 and Q2 = 0.7 Q1 the marginal cost of mining an 
additional unit of uranium is assumed to reach its lowest value, 70% of the refe-
rence cost P1, when the mine’s production stands at half of the reference level Q1. 
The individual mine supply curve is the upward sloping part of the marginal 
cost curve (the part above the average cost curve). The portion of the marginal 
cost curve above ATC (Figure 6) is a profit maximizing individual mine supply 
curve. Portions of the marginal cost curve to the left of the shut-down point (E2) 
are not part of the short run supply curve, because to produce on the left side of 
the E2 MC costs increase (dashed line in Figure 6) and ATC costs significantly 
increase. Operation in this part of the MC curve is uneconomical. 
 
Table 2. Reference data for costs calculation from the WISE Uranium Project Calculators. 
Reference U mines Type UG OP ISL 
Data from (Nuclear 
Energy Data, 2010): 
TOC, $ 2.81 × 108 3.47 × 108 1.11 × 108 
OM, $/yr 1.04 × 108 1.62 × 108 1.73 × 107 
DD, $ 3.39 × 107 5.92 × 107 2.86 × 107 
M, kg/yr 7.72 × 105 3.16 × 106 4.12 × 105 
Calculated from data 
following procedure 
in text 
ACC, $/yr 4.25 × 107 7.93 × 107 2.67 × 107 
ADD, $/yr 1.07 × 106 5.78 × 106 3.07 × 106 
IDC, $ 4.36 × 107 5.37 × 107 1.72 × 107 
UC, $/kg U 192 77.9 114 
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7.2. Short Run Market Supply and Demand Curves  
The short run market supply curve is defined as the horizontal sum of the 
individual mines’ supply curves, so that the amount that would be supplied Q 
by all agents at a price level p is: 
  
 ܳ =  ∑ ܳ௜(݌)௡௜ ୀଵ ,  (13) 
 
where n: number of U mines, Qi(p): supply curve of firm i from Equation (11). 
The graphical representation of the market supply curve construction is shown 
in Figure 6.  
 
 
The quantity of uranium supplied, the sources of that supply, and the U market 
price are all affected by the demand curve. Although in the short term the 
demand for LEU, i.e., nuclear reactor fuel may be treated as constant, the NU 
required to meet this need can be varied by secondary uranium management 
policies. It can also be modified by trading NU for SWU through adjustment of 
the tails assay from the enrichment process. This trade-off causes the demand 
curve for Figure 7 to be non-vertical; if it were not present, in the short run 
utilities would always require the same amount of NU (or its equivalent) to fuel 
reactors regardless of uranium price. The supply curve has horizontal parts, it 
means that multiple producers (U mines) offer uranium for the same price in 
given time period.  
The demand curve creation mechanism was developed and described in the 
reference model (Schneider et al., 2013), in short the algorithm involves finding 
the NU price PU [$/tonne U] for which each tails weight fraction would be cost-
minimizing when NU, SWU and conversion costs (for conversion services 
 
 
Figure 6. Uranium market supply curve creation.  
S1 S2
Stotal
Quantity
P
ri
ce
27 
purchased at user-specified price PC [$/tonne U], Table 3.) are all incorporated. 
The cost C [$/yr] of making LEU hexafluoride is given by summing the costs of 
purchasing uranium, conversion services and SWUs: 
 
 ܥ = ( ௎ܲ + ஼ܲ) ∙ ܷௗ + ௌܲௐ௎ ∙ ܹܷܵௗ + ௎ܲ ∙ ܷܰௗ (14) 
 
Here NUd is the (fixed for the time interval) NU demanded by reactors con-
suming unenriched uranium as fuel (i.e. CANDU rectors), while Ud is the 
demand for NU to be enriched to LEU. To find the NU price for which a DU 
235U weight (fissile uranium isotope with atomic mass number 235) fraction xw 
minimizes C, Equation 14 is differentiated with respect to xw, holding the other 
parameters constant, set equal to zero, and solved for PU. The process is 
laborious because Ud and SWUd depend from LEU tails weight fraction. It 
results in quite complex series of equations:  
 
0 = ( ௎ܲ + ஼ܲ) డడ௫ೢ ൤
௫೛ି௫ೢ
௫೑ି௫ೢ൨ + ௌܲௐ௎ ൤
డ
డ௫ೢ ൤
௫೛ି௫ೢ
௫೑ି௫ೢ൨ ቀܸ(ݔ௪) − ܸ൫ݔ௙൯ቁ + ൤
௫೛ି௫ೢ
௫೑ି௫ೢ − 1൨
డ௏(௫ೢ)
డ௫ೢ ൨, (15) 
 
where 
 
 డడ௫ೢ ൤
௫೛ି௫ೢ
௫೑ି௫ೢ൨ =
ଵ
௫೑ି௫ೢ ൬
௫೛ି௫ೢ
௫೑ି௫ೢ − 1൰ (16) 
 
and 
 
 డ௏(௫ೢ)డ௫ೢ = −2݈݊ ቀ
ଵି௫ೢ
௫ೢ ቁ − ቀ
ଵିଶ௫ೢ
ଵି௫ೢ ቁ ቀ1 +
ଵି௫ೢ
௫ೢ ቁ, (17) 
 
 
where xf : NU feed 235U weight fraction is known xf = 0.00711; xp: 235U product 
fraction. 
This expression can be rearranged to solve for PU. The process is repeated 
for each tails 235U weight fractions on 0.1% to 0.4% 235U, resulting in a set of 
(Ud, PU) points. Each point defines ‘the best’ the industry can do if it is able to 
purchase uranium at PU: purchase Ud kg of NU, tell enrichment plant operators 
to take tails to DU 235U fraction xw, and purchase SWUd separative work units at 
the market price PSWU. The set of points then traces out the demand curve, see in 
Figure 7.  
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Table 3. Global input parameters 
Description Mean Value 
World LEU fuel demand in 2010 6790 tonnes/yr 
World NU fuel demand in 2010 * 3390 tonnes/yr 
Average 235U content of LEU fuel 4.3 wt% 
World LEU & NU fuel demand growth rate 2.6%/yr 
Year continuous enrichment facility capacity growth commences 2018 
Enrichment facility capacity growth rate 2.6%/yr 
Cost of yellowcake-to-fluoride conversion $10/kg U 
WGPu fraction in MOX** 5 wt% of IHM 
235U content of HEU downblend stock 0.25 wt% 
Uranium Production Cost Multiplier 1.0 
SWU Production Cost Multiplier 1.0 
Mine Capacity Factor Multiplier 1.0 
* Certain reactors, e.g. CANDU, consume fuel fabricated from unenriched natural uranium. 
** Mixed oxide fuel 
 
Figure 7. Uranium market supply and demand curves in 2025. 
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7.3. A uranium market clearing model  
general sandbox scheme 
A uranium market clearing model is written in the MATLAB programming lan-
guage, which is quite commonly used in academia and allows generate graphs 
without additional packages. The main NFC module structure is built from 
several components and graphically can be seen in Figure 8:  
1. Database and input parameter block – contains information about U mines, 
secondary supply sources, enrichment services and other parameters. 
2. The model core – marching through simulation time period and executes 
subcomponents logic. 
3. Supply block – contains from several logical structures, i.e., individual U 
mine's decision – making algorithm, mine's supply curve construction logic, 
market supply curve construction, demand curve construction and market 
price calculation logic.  
4. Economic characteristic calculation block – contains logic which calculates 
actual selling and individual U mines profit or loses in given time period. As 
well this block contains logic, which decrement U mines reserves.  
5. Output data collection – store information about every simulation time 
period and construct graphs. 
 
Figure 8. A mine based uranium market clearing model structural blocks. 
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8. AN AGENT-BASED MODELLING APPROACH  
The agent-based modelling concept is widely used in energy systems modelling 
(Lakić et al., 2015; Gonzalez de Durana et al., 2014) and other fields to model 
individual agent’s behavior in ecosystem where each agent solves optimization 
task and makes individual decisions. In such a way it allows to model the 
behavior of a system by simulating the behavior of each individual agent. In the 
nuclear fuel cycle simulators this concept is used in the Cyclus project, which is 
the next-generation agent-based nuclear fuel cycle simulator where each com-
ponents act like an agent plugged to the main engine (Matthew et al., 2014).  
The current model uses a cycle type ABM approach that can be broken down 
into three steps:  
1. Initialize the model and uranium mines as agents with input parameters, 
global constraints and initial market conditions.  
2. Each agent observes outside information, i.e., uranium market price.  
3. Each agent takes an action based on the current observations, and the model 
repeats by going back to 2. 
This cycle becomes an adaptive ABM if we incorporate a fourth step between 
1 and 3 where each agent updates their internal parameters, and decides what 
action to take based on that internal model. The structural scheme of such 
approach can be seen in Figure 9 (Wolpert et al., 1999). 
 
 
Figure 9. An adaptive ABM concept. 
 
In majority of cases agents are small units in large ecosystem, where single unit 
decisions cannot affect whole ecosystem. In a uranium mine based market 
clearing model an individual agent can represent large U mine, which has 
significant effect on a uranium market share. Therefore, such agents have weight 
fraction on NU market and individual decisions can affect market price. An 
ABM decision making capability can be built with multiple techniques depending 
on needs. In case, if is requires agents which can learn and develop new decision 
dynamically a machine learning concept must be used. Neural networks for 
instance, are good at classifying large amounts of data very quickly, but in the 
end, they do not yield how decisions are actually taken. Therefore, complexes 
reverse engineering procedure need to be applied and in many cases decision 
has no rational explanation. Alternative options is to use decision trees to create 
very white box results, but are not very good at classifying continuous data. There 
are variety information in literature that discuss machine learning algorithms, 
their implementations and their pros and cons (Mitchell 1997; Hastie, Tibshirani 
et al. 2001). 
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8.1. Uranium mine agent decision tree 
During each year of the simulation the market clearing model uses the decision 
tree criteria summarized at the beginning of this section to determine whether 
each mine will operate. It then must decide how much uranium the mine will 
contribute to the total amount supplied across the industry. The model simulates 
the uranium market for each year of the simulation using the following scheme, 
starting with the first year of the simulation (t = 1) and running through the last 
year, t = T and is built around the database that contains information about 
mines availability for production, annual production capacity and total reserves 
(Eggert et al., 2011). This loop is visualized in Figure 10: 
1. The supply curve is drawn by finding the amount supplied as a function of 
price. To begin, the market price is set to 0. 
2. The secondary supplies are added to the supply curve. 
3. The offer loop is performed for the set price. In this step the model deter-
mines which mines are operating and how much material they are producing. 
The offer logic is described below. 
4. The total suppliable amount from the available mines in current time period 
at the set price level is summed to determine the cumulative supply. 
5. A check is performed to see if the current model price is equal to a user-
specified maximum modelled price. 
a. If the market price equals the maximum, proceed to step 6. 
b. If the market price is not yet equal to the maximum price, the market 
price is increased by a small user-specified increment and returned to step 
2 above. 
6. The supply curve is now drawn. The uranium demand curve for the time step 
is next drawn using methods that were described in (World Nuclear Asso-
ciation, 2008). 
7. The intersection of the supply and demand curves is found and determines 
the market price for the time step. 
8. The mine reserves are updated by deducting the offered amount (quantity 
supplied at the market price) from each mine currently operating. This block 
simulates actual market where U supplier meets its buyer. Here are few pre-
defined conditions about priorities for new market participants and a long-
term player. Predefined rules are important in case when multiple U mines 
try to sell uranium by the same price. In this case can be said, that U mines 
has equal chance to sell uranium. The predefined selling chance conditions 
for U mines are: 
a. The model checks whether mine sold uranium in a previous simulation 
time period. If U mine was selling uranium in a previous simulation 
period, that such mines has advantage over newly market players. Such 
condition simulates long term relationship between supplier and buyer. 
b. Cheaper producers, has bigger probability to sell more uranium in a 
market and make bigger profit. 
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9. The current time of the simulation is checked against the value of the 
simulation end time (T). 
a. If t < T, time is incremented by one year and the loop restarts. 
b. If t = T the simulation ends. 
 
Inside the offer loop, the following operations are performed for each mine in 
the simulation, starting with the first mine (n = 1). The loop is visualized in 
Figure 11: 
1. The mine is checked for availability. Any mine not currently able to operate 
in the given year is unavailable. 
a. If the mine is not available, skip to the next mine. 
b. If the mine is available, proceed to step 2. 
2. The mine is checked for operation in the previous time step. 
a. If the mine operated in the previous time step, go to step 3. 
b. If no uranium was produced by the mine in the previous time step, 
proceed to step 4. 
3. The E2 of the mine is check against the current market price. 
a. If E2 is greater than or equal to the market price proceed to step 5. 
b. If E2 is less than market price the mine enters temporary shutdown and 
the model restarts at step 1 with the next mine. 
4. If the mine did not operate in the previous time-step, the current market price 
is checked against the mine’s E1. 
a. If E1 is greater than or equal to the market price, a new mine is opened 
and the model proceeds to step 5. 
b. If E1 is less than the market price, the loop restarts with the next mine. 
5. The mine is flagged to produce uranium during the current time step. 
6. A check is made to determine if the current mine is the last mine in the 
simulation (n = N). 
a. If true, the loop ends. 
b. If false, the loop is restarted with the next mine in the list. 
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 Figure 10. The main time loop algorithm. 
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8.2. Uranium mine agent with profit accumulation and 
time delay function 
The profit accumulation and time delay function are an extension of main 
operation decision event chain described in previous section and displayed in 
Figure 11. In certain U market conditions the natural U price can fall and stay 
relatively low for several years. In such case we introduce the loss minimization 
logic, which allows keep open U mine under the long run market exit price and 
use accumulated profit to cover marginal costs. U mine will bankrupt when all 
Figure 11. Uranium mine operation decision making event chain. 
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accumulated profit is used and a market price is under the long run market exit 
price. In such case the model will try to open U mine once again after several 
years (depends from the model configuration), if the market conditions will 
satisfy U mine economic parameters. In such case the annual profit calculation 
logic will start calculation from reopening year. The opening and reopening 
time delay will reduce the supply since uranium producers will enter the market 
slower when the conditions are favorable. Their tolerance to continue operating 
is based on their accumulated profits. The excess liquidity are high enough to 
cover operation and maintenance (OM) costs and keep mine open until market 
conditions become more favorable. This will make the market much more 
volatile than modelled in a mine-based U market clearing model and resemble 
the actual market behavior more realistically. We assumed, that reopening delay 
time simulate U property ownership change and related legal issues and mine 
relicensing. However, the time delay function did not include additional costs 
that are related to U mine reopening. 
The enhanced decision making is applicable in each simulation time step, 
where the model calculates annual profit or losses based on actually sold U 
amount by current market price. In case if U mine was working with the profit, 
certain share will be paid out to shareholders, other part will be diverted to the 
special accumulated profit fund. We will use a dividend payout ratio of 55% 
which was the average payout ratio for the mining industry in 2012 (Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission, 2007). It has to be noted that the exact value of the 
payout is irrelevant and rather the sensitivity of the payout ratio to economic 
value is analyzed.  
In Figure 12 the accumulated profit calculation algorithm is shown.  
1.  For each mine in the simulation, starting with the first mine (n = 1), module 
is finding accumulated profit calculation start time. 
2.  Checks if accumulated profit calculation time is less than current time 
period. 
a.  If Tst < T, continue with a sold quantity check in the time period Tst. 
b.  If Tst => T, continue with accumulated profit check. 
3.  Check, if quantity that is sold by the calculation period market price, can 
cover mine’s running costs (OM). 
a.  If running costs is covered, calculate profit. 
b.  If running costs is not covered, calculate loses. 
4.  Sum annual profit or loses in the time period Tst taking into account dividend 
payments. 
5.  Increase valuation time step Tst. 
6.  Check if a mine is not operating with losses in the financial lifetime. 
a. ACC > 0, in the current calculation period mine is working with profit; 
ACC calculate for the next period. 
b. Continue with the suspended operation check. 
7. Check if U mine operation was suspended due to bankruptcy. 
a.  U mine is not bankrupt, continue calculation for next time period. 
b.  U mine is in bankruptcy, exit from accumulated profit calculation loop. 
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Figure 12. Uranium mine accumulated profit event chain. 
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9. ECONOMICAL EFFECT EVALUATION IN A MINE BASED 
URANIUM MINING MARKET CLEARING MODEL  
The features added to the model, i.e., profit accumulation and decision delay 
functions makes model more realistic and the economic value of these changes 
can be measured and compared to the mine-based market clearing model results. 
By default, a mine-based U market clearing model does not take into account 
uranium mine licensing issues and other operational activities, allowing for new 
mines to open, reopen or shut down instantly. The time which is needed to reopen 
the mine is closely related to the economic and regulative environment and often 
is not solely dependent on the producer’s decision. The profit accumulation 
function simulates ability to distributes some of the earnings back to investors 
and retains rest of the earnings for the future needs to cover mine fixed costs 
such as maintenance and labor costs whenever the marginal costs are below the 
average total costs.  
The time delay will reduce the supply since uranium producers will enter the 
market slower when the conditions are favorable. Their tolerance to continue 
operating is based on their accumulated profits. The excess liquidity is high 
enough to cover operation and maintenance (OM) costs and keep mine open until 
market conditions become more favorable. This will make the market much more 
volatile and resemble the actual market behavior more realistically. The latter is 
also presented in Figure 13. In an ideal market where supply and demand are 
ideally matched the price would always stay the same over time if no shocks 
occur in the marketplace. This is reflected as scenario S* on the chart. The line 
S1 represents a case where U mines enter or exit the market whenever market 
price is favorable to mines. The line S2 reflects the case with time delay and 
profit accumulation function so miners will constantly over- and underreact to 
current situations causing more volatility in the marketplace. 
 
 
Figure 13. Uranium market supply curves 
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9.1. Profit accumulator model effect on  
an individual uranium mine 
Operational decisions are based on the current market price and accumulated 
profits. If the current market price exceeds marginal costs the producer is ope-
rational. If the current market price (P) is below marginal costs per unit (MC) 
the producer can stay operational until the producer is able to cover the losses 
from producing the anticipated quantity (Q) with accumulated profits (Π). 
Accumulated profits are defined as: 
 
 
 (18) 
 
where R demounts the share of retained earnings and n stands for the number of 
periods included in the model, whereas 1-R reflects the share of earnings that 
are distributed to shareholders. Hence the condition for operating is the 
following: 
 
  (19) 
 If the company is unable to continue production, it will shut down its operations 
instantly until the current market price exceeds production costs per unit. At that 
time a decision will be made to reopen the mine. Reopening the mine takes time 
and is dependent on the time required for obtaining operating licenses, hiring 
personnel and restarting other operations (T) (PwC, 2013). Such a behavior leads 
to over and underreacting in the marketplace. The economic logic is illustrated 
on Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14. Individual uranium mine production regulation 
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Whereas in mine based market clearing model the miners would reduce the 
amount of production to Q+1 or even 0 if the price were below the marginal cost 
or production price P0 then in the model with profit accumulation logic built in 
the miner keeps the production rate the same at period t+1 causing the miner to 
overproduce. This leads to increased supply in the marketplace causing prices to 
drop from P0 to P+1. 
 
 
9.2. Economic value and price dynamic calculation 
The introduction of profit accumulation model and time delay in reopening the 
mines is expected to increase volatility in the market. The profit accumulation 
model assumes that companies will stay in operation even if their production 
costs per unit are higher than the current market price. Changes in the current 
market price decrease new mines entering the market. When new producers 
enter the market the supply curve shifts to the right and price decreases from P1 
to P2, quantity increases from Q to Q* as is shown in Figure 15. Since mines do 
not shut down instantly which would instantly reduce supply and make the 
supply curve shift to the left again the quantity stays the same (or increases if 
new producers would enter the market) until the producers run out of accumu-
lated profits.  
When individual mines go bankrupt the supply curve starts shifting to the 
left (slowly) but if there are enough producers operating in loss the number of 
bankruptcies increases suddenly and the supply curve makes a sudden shift to 
the left causing price to increase suddenly. Price increase allows less efficient 
producers to become profitable again and mines make the decision to reenter the 
market. Because there is a time delay a lot of producers enter the market at the 
same time causing sudden increase in supply and sudden drop in the price 
leading to new wave of bankruptcies.  
This leads to much higher volatility on the market compared to conditions 
where producers can enter and exit the market instantly and make decisions 
based on current market price.  
A number of different scenarios are analyzed where two variables – share of 
profits and time delay – and their sensitivity are analyzed based on the economic 
value of the scenario compared to base scenario. The economic value (EV) is 
defined as the total change in market value of the produced uranium. We can 
calculate the economic value for a certain time period according to the formula: 
 
  (2 ) 
 
The economic value is positive when the total market value of the produced 
uranium increases and negative when the market value of produced uranium 
decreases. In that sense EV is that change in market value.  
The value of EV depends on the steepness of the demand curve near the 
current equilibrium price. The steeper the demand curve near the current 
EV ¼ P1  Q  P2  Q : 0
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equilibrium price the bigger is the price decrease and smaller the change quantity. 
With steep demand curve the EV is negative. Since we expect the demand to be 
relatively rigid the demand curve is steep – price changes don’t significantly 
increase or decrease consumption since demand is relatively non-elastic. Hence 
scenarios that include bigger price changes are expected to have more signi-
ficant impact on the economic value.   
 
 
Figure 15. Market price and supply changes 
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10. AN OPTIMAL NFC EVALUATION WITH MASS 
EQUILIBRIUM MODEL (BASED ON PUBLICATION III) 
Previous sections outlined possibility to simulate individual U mines decision 
making strategy and focused only on front-end nuclear fuel cycle. This section 
will present an autonomous dynamic decision-making tool in a nuclear fuel cycle 
simulator, which verifies optimal NFC bases on the expected cost of electricity 
(CoE) as the simulation driving factor. In the most of the NFC simulators such 
as VISON, GENIUS or NFCSim must be manually specified certain NFC to be 
simulated, or total produced energy demand for nuclear power and a target NFC 
with specific reactor’s technologies allowed to be built subject to satisfaction of 
material balance model. (Schneider et al., 2003;Schneider et al., 2005; Oliver 
2009). A mine-based uranium market clearing model does not focus on an actual 
NFC, but tries to satisfy NU demand which is determined with predefined growth 
rate.  
A key capability of the model described here is to solve optimization task and 
find optimal NFC based upon objective criteria. Such capability is achieved by 
issuing automatic reactor technology building. Based on optimization aim, 
defined by the multi-criteria objective function, the agents might make certain 
technology deployment decision. In principle, any objective function repre-
senting a combination of different criteria, for example, the costs of electricity, 
natural resource consumption reduction, nuclear materials proliferation risks 
minimization, can be defined. Later the reactor build decision can be based 
upon optimization problem solving. In a real life, the highly nonlinear nature of 
the constraints imposed by the time-dependent material balance, that compose 
the objective function, cause decision-making very difficult to by implemented. 
This section demonstrates generalized autonomous decision making approach 
that is based on minimization of cost of electricity (CoE) alone. However there 
are no limits to extend the objective function with multiple criteria. A nuclear 
fuel cycle and cycle economy simulation tool VEGAS is used to find optimal 
reactor technology mix. The tool is written in JavaTM programming language 
(Juchau et al., 2011). VEGAS uses traditional present-value levelized cost of 
electricity (LCOE) analyses to calculate reactor and fuel cycle costs. In VEGAS 
each defined reactor is described with capacity (MWe) and lifetime, along with 
other economical parameters. The tool assumes that each reactor will always 
serve out their complete lifetime operating at their full capacity. VEGAS is built 
to compute individual nuclear reactor input and output mass flow in each simu-
lation time step, avoiding from overhead to track individual fuel batches iso-
topic composition. Such approach is acceptable, when calculation is applied 
over a long period and the aim is simulate many reactors and different techno-
logies. VEGAS tracks nuclear materials in entire simulation period and consider 
required cooling time of spent fuel to meet safety and technical requirements for 
reprocessing. Whenever VEGAS detects energy supply deficit, it tries to deploy 
new reactor to meet the specified energy demand. Since the tool simulates entire 
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reactor lifetime, then is highly likelihood that some nuclear reactors burn fuel 
which made of reprocessed spent fuel of other reactors and will not be able to 
operate because of fuel shortages. Such behavior leads the simulator to roll back 
simulation clock in time when the most recent reactor of the type with the fuel 
shortage was built and replacing it with a different type of reactor and other 
fuel. This rolling back algorithm is repeated until the simulation is finished at 
defined simulation period and all reactors being fully operated in entire 
simulation time. Before the improvements the simulation was designed in a way 
that it added new facilities based on time-dependent build priorities specified by 
user. The main concept how VEGAS works is to ensure that reactor is always 
operation in entire lifetime. It relies on predefined user scenery as to when and 
how to begin deploying new technologies. In addition to the predefined techno-
logy mix the user could manually determine economically attractive scenarios.  
Optimization based upon nuclear fuel cycle cost ideally includes a degree of 
foresight. The full mathematical optimization would require complete foresight 
of many economic parametrs, but that is arguably not a realistic depiction of 
how agents make decisions. In a real life agents also make decisions which 
include some degree of freedom. In VEGAS NFC simulator decisions will be 
made on the basis of the CoE-minimising equilibrium fuel cycle. Any combi-
nation of reactor types can meet the equilibrium fuel cycle condition which 
means that at least one hard material balance constraint must be satisfied. An 
equilibrium conditions is described by a specific reactor technology deployment 
ratio.  
As example can be given fuel cycle with light water reactors (LWR) and 
low-conversion ratio fast neutron reactors. Such fuel cycle has equilibrium of 
~2.5 MWt of LWRs deployed/MWt of fast reactors deployed. (OECD Nuclear 
Energy Agency, 2002). This equilibrium state means that to satisfy material 
balance constraints the fast neutron reactors are fissioning the transuranic ele-
ments at the same rate as they are being produced in the LWRs. This simulation 
approach requires finding the equilibria state for all possible nuclear fuel cycles 
depending from technology mix. Currently are many commercially available 
nuclear reactor technologies and in the foreseeing time even more technologies 
are likely to become available. Even to find an equilibrium fuel cycle become 
challenging if many of the technologies are made available to the simulation 
and each technology is a member of different fuel cycle. Once equilibrium state 
is achieved then the CoE for each equilibrium cycle may be calculated. Later on 
build decision can be based on newly acquired equilibrium conditions. The 
equilibrium costs might also have time dependent stochastic nature since the 
composition of CoEs includes multiple criteria, such as uranium price, labor 
costs etc. Thus, this simulation approach can track the changes in the targeted 
equilibrium by adjusting technologies and react to uranium price changes. As 
well the simulator can switch between fuel cycle types – from once-through to a 
closed fuel cycle (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002; Shropshire et al., 
2009). 
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10.1. Nuclear fuel cycle tree 
A simplified NFC model is allowed to consist of up to three types (tiers) of 
reactors hierarchically reprocessing each other’s fuel. The model represents 
both nuclear fuel cycles, i.e., once-through and closed. In VEGAS, the com-
position vector for nuclear reactor fuel has 4 lumped components: uranium (U), 
plutonium (Pu), minor actinides (MA) and fission products (FP), but the 
approach proposed here generalizes to more finely resolved composition vectors. 
A flowchart for such an NFC is illustrated in Figure 16, which shows how 
reactors are assigned to a tier based on if and what they are capable of reproces-
sing. Tier 0 usually means a thermal neutrons spectrum reactor burning uranium 
fuel where belongs most of current nuclear reactors. The Tier 1 denotes pluto-
nium burning reactors while tier 2 is represented by transuranic (TRU) element 
burning reactors, possibly capable of reusing their own reprocessed spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF). The SNF from a reactor can be either sent to waste or be 
reprocessed to fuel the next tier reactors, or in the case of tier 2, to fuel itself 
(Pelakauskas et al., 2013).  
 
 
Figure 16. A Typical NFC flowchart 
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10.2. Nuclear fuel cycle equilibrium calculation 
For all possible combinations of reactor types, the mass equilibrium model cal-
culates the relative throughput of materials in each NFC facility based on 
defined charge and discharge compositions for each reactor type. The tier 0 is a 
primary technology with which all other technologies must work in equilibrium 
to consume the generated plutonium or transuranic materials.  
To carry out calculation of mass flow equilibrium for a technology mix that is 
identified in the previous section, the technologies is categorized by all possible 
NFC types: 
1. Once-through fuel cycle (includes tier 0 only). Currently describes existing 
nuclear reactor fleet in the world, which represents LEU burners and CANDU 
reactors. 
2. Pu recycling scenario (tier 0 and tier1). This NFC includes MOX fuel burners;  
3. TRU recycling scenario (tier 0 and tier 2; or tier 0, tier 1 and tier 2, or tier 2 
only for a breeder reactor). 
The mass equilibrium calculation process is described in the next equations 
and is repeated from autonomous dynamic decision making in a nuclear fuel 
cycle simulator methodology. Input natural uranium mass is found from 
equation 21 which calculates uranium needed as feed for the enrichment process 
per kilogram of product: 
 
 
, (21)
 
 
where F – number of kilograms of feed material, P – number of kilograms of 
product enriched, xw – weight fraction of 235U in the waste, xp – weight fraction 
of 235U in the product, xf – weight fraction of 235U in the feed material. 
Input and output composition recipes are used to obtain the tracked heavy 
metal (U, Pu and MA) mass streams at equilibrium for each flow shown in 
Figure 17. The recipes along with other parameters of the reactors selected for 
the test case are given in Table 4 and are taken from (OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency, 2002). Refer to Figure 17 for definitions of mass flows and symbols 
used in this section. The input U fuel mass, M0, is initially normalized to 1 kg. 
The remainder of this section outlines the calculation of the masses M1 and M2 
of tier 1 and 2 reactor fuel per unit mass of tier 0 reactor fuel. The M1 stream is 
calculated according to: 
 
 
, (22)
 
 
where yPu,0 – output Pu mass fraction from tier 0 reactor, xU,1 – uranium input 
fraction in tier 1 reactor, xPu,1 – Pu input fraction in tier 1 reactor.  
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The TRU burner reactor (tier 2) fuel mass may be limited by the availability 
of either Pu or MA. The MA available to the tier 2 reactor, mMA, comes from the 
reprocessed tier 1 fuel and tier 0 reactors' MA that bypassed tier 1: 
 
 , (23) 
 
where yMA,1 – output MA fraction from tier 1 reactor, yMA,0 – output MA 
fraction from tier 0 reactor.  
 
The mass stream M2 calculation in the case when the TRU burner reactor is 
limited in its deployment by availability of MA and does not reprocess its own 
fuel is described in equation 24: 
 
 
, (24)
 
 
where xU,2 – uranium input fraction in tier 2 reactor, xMA,2 – MA input fraction 
in tier 2 reactor, xPu,2 – Pu input fraction in tier 2 reactor. 
 
When TRU burners reprocess their own fuel and are MA-limited, M2 is given 
by: 
 
, (25)
 
 
where yMA,2 – output MA fraction from tier 2 reactor, xMA,2 – MA input fraction 
in tier 2 reactor. 
 
When the TRU burner reactors reprocess their own fuel and are Pu-limited, M2 
is given by: 
 
 
, (26)
 
 
where yPu,1 – output Pu mass fraction from tier 1 reactor, xU,2 – uranium input 
fraction in tier 2 reactor, xPu,2 – Pu input mass fraction in tier 2 reactor, yPu,2 – 
output Pu mass fraction from tier 2 reactor. Whichever of the constraints (Pu 
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limited or MA limited) leads to the smaller value of M2 is the actual limiting 
constraint. 
 
Figure 17. Equilibrium mass flows through a generic three tier NFC. Solid line arrows 
show the flow of uranium fuel, dashed arrows show the flow of Plutonium fuel and 
dotted arrows show the flow of TRU fuel.  
 
  
47 
Table 4. Parameters of the nuclear reactors selected for the test case. The current fleet 
approximates the mix of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactors 
(BWR) currently operating in the USA. APWR-UOX is an Advanced Pressurized Water 
Reactor burning uranium Oxide fuel. SFR is a Sodium Cooled Fast Burner Reactor. 
Reactor name Current 
fleet
APWR-
UOX
SFR 
Tier 0 0 2 
Plant size (MWe) 900 1450 600 
Thermal efficiency (%) 35 35 42 
Availability (%) 90 90 85 
Input U enrichment (%) 4.2 4.9 0.25 
Input U mass fraction, xU 1 1 0.669 
Input Pu mass fraction, xPu 0 0 0.291 
Input MA mass fraction, xMa 0 0 0.0398 
Output U mass fraction, yU 0.93595 0.92466 0.5931 
Output Pu mass fraction, yPu 0.01110 0.01194 0.24769 
Output MA mass fraction, yMa 0.00129 0.00160 0.030 
Minimums cooling time (years) 4 4 4 
Can reprocess SNF from – – SFR, APWR-UOX 
 
 
10.3. Cost of electricity calculation 
The methodology for costs of electricity calculation is taken from autonomous 
dynamic decision making in a nuclear fuel cycle simulator. The cost of electri-
city (CoE) calculation consists of 3 major components: reactor construction (RC), 
operations and maintenance (OM) and fuel cycle costs (FCC), and is given in 
equation 27. Reactor construction costs reflect yearly reactor construction loan 
payments. OM costs represent all the services required to assure normal ope-
ration of the reactor. FCC includes all the costs related to fresh and spent fuel. 
 
  (27) 
 
The RC part of the CoE can be expressed in units of $/kWh as: 
 
 
 (28) 
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where K is the total capital investment cost in $, Ey is the yearly energy pro-
duction in kWh/year, r is the invest rate of capital in units of 1/year and T0 in 
years is the number of years in the repayment period. K is related to the 
overnight construction cost by: 
 
  
(29)
 
 
where CO is the overnight construction cost in $ and TC is the construction 
period in years. 
 
The OM part of the CoE in units of $/kWh is expressed as: 
 
 
, (30)
 
 
where CyO&M is the yearly total operations and maintenance cost in $/year and 
Ey is the total yearly energy production in kWh/year. 
 
The FCC in units of $/kWh is:  
 
 
, (31)
 
 
where Mi is the process mass flow in kg or separative work units (SWU) 
associated with the production of E kWh of energy, UCi is the unit cost in $/kg 
or $/SWU, ri is the discount rate associated with that process in 1/year and Ti is 
the lag or lead time of the cost with respect to a reference time in years. 
 
In this particular case the only cost input allowed to vary with time is the cost of 
natural uranium (NU). While other costs are fixed, NU price growth is 
described by a model proposed in the 2011 Massachusetts Institute of Techno-
logy (MIT) assessment of the NFC (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009): 
 
 (32)
 
 
in which CU is current cost of NU in $/kg, U is the total amount of uranium 
extracted until the current time, Ur is the cumulative amount of uranium 
extracted up to some reference time, CrU is the production cost of NU at that 
reference time and θ is the growth coefficient. The values of θ are 0.11 for the 
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50% cumulative probability density function (CPDF) percentile, which corres-
ponds to the median case, and 0.29 for the 85% CPDF percentile corresponding 
to the conservative choice (Juchau et al., 2011). 
 
 
10.4. Reactor building decision making model 
Initially VEGAS were built in a way that simulation was driven by predefined 
user's parameter selection. The simulator code is extended with addtion to select 
lowest cost equilibrium NFC strategy and issue dynamic reactor build order. 
Figure 18 shows the computation algorithm. Dynamic decision making is based 
on the yearly CoE analysis for equilibrium nuclear fuel cycle and allows simu-
lation of nuclear technology competitiveness given that uranium costs are not 
constant over time. 
The NFC simulation tool VEGAS takes annual electricity demand growth 
rate, which is predefined for simulation and current nuclear reactor fleet retire-
ment rate as inputs for certain region. Annual demand growth rate is expressed 
as a function of time as given by: 
 
 (33) 
 
where P(t0) – installed capacity at time t0; growth – growth rate; Y(t) = t – t0 – 
time after start of simulation.  
 
VEGAS issue dynamic build orders for the simulation in every simulation time 
period, which is one year. The uranium price is calculated at the start of every 
time step. This is then used to calculate the CoE of every possible equilibrium 
fuel cycle for that year, which allows them to be evaluated and the cheapest one 
to be identified.  
As is displayed in the algorithmically scheme in the Figure 18, then the next 
step of the simulation creates build orders for the current year using the reactor 
technology mix of the cheapest equilibrium state. If the requirements for energy 
demand is satisfied for the current time loop, no new build orders are issued. 
However, if demand is not met, additional reactor build orders are issued in the 
technology ratio of the current lowest cost equilibrium NFC. 
 
D(t) = P(t0)[1 + growth]Y(t) , 
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Figure 18. The NFC simulator computation algorithm. The possible NFCs with their 
corresponding equilibrium masses are determined once at the beginning of the 
simulation. This data is then used to find the cheapest NFC on a yearly basis.  
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11. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The result section will illustrate a mine-based market clearing model decision 
algorithm for a simple scenario characterized by a limited number of uranium 
mines and constant LEU demand and depiction for world scenery. It also will 
demonstrate decision time delay and accumulated profit function effect on a U 
market price. The second section includes improved NFC model VEGAS test 
case to illustrate how the new decision making model switches between dif-
ferent reactor technologies as the equilibrium electricity cost changes over time. 
 
 
11.1. A mine-based uranium market clearing model 
configuration and test 
The test case is designed to illustrate the decision algorithm for a simple scenario 
characterized by a limited number of uranium mines and constant LEU demand. 
The simulation runs from 2010 to 2030 under a fixed annual reactor fuel demand 
of 6790 t/year of 4.5% enriched U and 3390 t/year of natural U to supply 
CANDU and other NU-fueled reactors. These values are representative of world 
reactor fuel demand in 2010 and will be used again in a full-scale scenario of 
world production and demand is presented as well as in a time delay test case. 
As additional simplifications for this test case, the enrichment price is fixed at 
$100/SWU and no secondary supplies of U are made available. Table 4 contains 
information about total reserves, annual U extraction rate, production costs, year 
from which each mine is available to enter production and mining method. 
The simulation test case aims to demonstrate:  
1. mine opening decisions based on market price; 
2. the effect of supply capacity changes on short and long run market prices; 
3. competition effects where a lower-cost U mine becoming available displaces 
other U mines from the market; 
4. mine opening decision time delay effect evaluation; 
5. accumulated profit function effect on a uranium market price. 
Table 5 lists the properties of the five mines included in both demonstration 
cases. Recall that the uranium production cost table entry is the cost, in $/kgU, 
if the mine produces at its reference annual extraction rate. The amount actually 
produced every year by each mine depends on the market-clearing price as 
described in the previous section. In this test case, mine E is a large and 
inexpensive U producer with a production cost of 50 $/kgU at its reference 
capacity 30,000 tU/year. Unlike the other mines, mine E has a large uranium 
reserve that will not be exhausted during the 2010–30 period. Of the other 
mines, A, B and C feature progressively higher costs and will open in succes-
sion if demand warrants it. Mine D cannot open earlier than 2018, but its low 
reference production cost, 60 $/kgU, may cause the U market price to decrease 
and might push some other U mine out of the market. 
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Table 5. Primary uranium supply data 
U 
mine 
Total 
Reserves & 
Resources tU 
Reference Annual 
Extraction Rate 
tU/year
Year 
Available 
Reference 
Cost $/kg U 
Mining 
Method 
A 150,000 15,000 2009 75 ISL 
B 300,000 15,000 2009 100 ISL 
C 200,000 20,000 2009 120 UG 
D 150,000 15,000 2018 60 ISL 
E 10,000,000 30,000 2009 50 UG 
 
To illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the shape assigned to the individual 
supply curves, the test case is carried out for three values of the (P2, Q2) lowest-
cost production point which was described previously. The Q value is the 
quantity at which the marginal cost of producing the next unit is minimized, 
while P is the marginal cost at that quantity. Table 6 lists the P2 and Q2 values 
studied. They are normalized against the reference cost and quantity respec-
tively, so that P2 = 0.5, Q2 = 0.5 means that the mine’s marginal cost is mini-
mized at 50% of its reference production level, and at that level its MC is 50% 
of the reference value. Hence changing the P and Q coefficients alters the slope 
and shape of the supply curve as shown in Figure 19. The steeper the supply 
curve for Q > 1, the costlier it is for the mine to produce additional uranium 
beyond its reference annual capacity. This reflects the need to make short term 
investments in additional equipment and labor. 
 
Table 6. Individual supply curve coefficients 
No. Q2 P2
1 0.8 0.5 
2 0.7 0.5 
3 0.5 0.5 
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In the Table 7 is combined profit accumulation model configuration for each test 
case. In this case data of Q value (quantity at which the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the next unit) and P (the marginal cost at that quantity) are normalized 
against the reference quantity and cost respectively, so that Q = 0.5 and P = 0.7, 
meaning that the mine’s marginal cost is minimized at 50% of its reference 
production level, and at that the level of its MC is 70% of the reference value. 
 
Table 7. U mine profit accumulation model configuration 
Scenario/ 
configuration openAfterYears * defStartTime** profitIndex*** 
1 5 2 55 
2 3 2 55 
* Allows to restart U mine operations after bankruptcy in fixed time period, if market 
conditions satisfy individual U mine’s economic characters 
** Accumulated profit calculation start time for each of the individual U mines 
*** Sets the share of profits that is paid to the shareholders (in percentage). The other 
part of the profit will be redirected in the accumulated profit fund. 
 
 
11.1.1. Mine opening decisions tests case results 
Figure 20a–c shows the uranium supply mix for the three supply curve calibra-
tions presented in the test case. The general trends are similar: the two lowest-
cost mines, A and E, initially provide all supply. In order to do so, they both 
produce somewhat more uranium than their reference capacity annually. Figure 
21 shows the uranium price evolution for each calibration. It can be seen that 
the uranium price is initially above $75/kgU, the reference production cost for 
 
Figure 19. The individual supply curve with different coefficients 
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mine A, for all three calibrations. However, only for the steepest calibration 
(P = 0.5, Q = 0.8) does mine B enter into production as well. This is because at 
this calibration mines A and E cannot increase production far beyond their 
design values without incurring sharply increasing costs. Therefore, in this case 
mine B can profitably enter into production if it produces somewhat less 
uranium than its reference capacity (hence at somewhat lower than its reference 
$100/kg U cost). 
Regardless of calibration, in 2018 low-cost mine D becomes available and is 
entered into production. This causes the price of uranium to drop, but not so far 
as to drop below mine A’s long- term shutdown price. Therefore, A continues to 
operate until its supply is exhausted. For the case where mine B had already 
entered the market, though, it chooses to enter short term shutdown when mine 
D opens. Only after mine A is exhausted does it become feasible for B to again 
enter the market. In all cases, after D is exhausted, the market clearing price rises 
as mines B and E are operating since B has substantially higher costs than D. 
This demonstration case illustrates the effect of the individual firm supply 
curve elasticities. It is possible to affect firms’ decision-making by modifying 
their supply curves. The original model of (Schneider et al., 2013) was in-
flexible in the sense that each mine could only produce at its reference capacity 
and cost.   
This misses the flexibility mines have to respond to changes in price by 
expanding or reducing production. Although not evident from the plots, the 
rollback algorithm prevented mine “C” from opening shortly before inexpensive 
mine “D” became available in 2018. Mine “C” features somewhat higher ope-
rating costs than “B” but would have been profitable had “D” not appeared. 
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Figure 20. Amount supplied per period with coefficients: (a) Q = 0.5, P = 0.5; 
(b) Q = 0.7, P = 0.5; (c) Q = 0.8, P = 0.5. 
 
 
 
 
? ?
(a)       (b)
(c)
Figure 21. Market clearing price. 
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11.1.2. Mine opening decisions world case results 
The world case scenario utilizes the reference-case uranium and enrichment 
industries described in (Schneider et al., 2013) and summarized here. As Table 
S1 shows, the reference scenario does assume that weapons grade plutonium, 
down blended highly enriched uranium (HEU), and stocks of natural uranium 
will be available as secondary sources of supply and that re-enrichment of stored 
depleted uranium continues. Other global parameters used in the reference 
scenario are given in supplements in the Table 3. This case assumes a 2.6% 
annual LEU fuel demand growth from its 2010 value. Enrichment plant capa-
cities follow the schedule given in Table S2; in addition, all enrichment plant 
capacities are assumed to grow at a rate equal to that of LEU demand, an 
average of 2.6% per year, in each year after 2018. In the world case, the 
coefficients in the individual mines’ supply curves were chosen to be P1 = 0.7, 
Q1 = 0.7. The world case results are illustrated in Figures 22–27. NU and SWU 
consumption both increase in proportion to overall demand growth, as can been 
seen in Figures 22 and 23. NU usage, though, is seen to grow at an average 
annual rate of slightly less than 2.0%, while SWU use grows at an annual rate of 
3.6%. This difference arises because the price of uranium (Figure 24) is seen to 
rise through the simulation period, while the price of SWU (Figure 25) falls. 
The decline in the SWU price can be attributed to oversupply as well as com-
pletion of the transition away from diffusion to cheaper centrifuge technology. 
As the SWU price falls, the optimal tails enrichment (Figure 26) trends down-
ward as well. By shifting to lower tails assays, consumers are substituting NU 
for SWU. Note that the SWU price and consumption, NU price and con-
sumption and optimal tails are coupled to one another and are derived in calcu-
lations that take place in each year of the simulation. 
As mentioned, the SWU price is seen to decline from $160/SWU in 2010 to 
$90/SWU in 2020 even as annual SWU consumption increases by 44%. As 
existing U mines exhaust their resources and close, new mines open pushing 
marginal costs and hence prices above $100/kg. As the market price approaches 
$120/kg U, it becomes worthwhile for several new mines to come online, 
stabilizing the NU price by the mid-2020s.  
Figure 27 illustrates the supply and demand curves giving rise to the market 
clearing condition in one arbitrarily selected year, 2025. The xw values noted on 
the demand curve are the U-235 mass fractions in the enrichment tailings 
corresponding to the indicated locations on the demand curve. The sloping 
demand curve illustrates the tradeoff between NU and SWU, as points with 
lower xw values rely more heavily on enrichment and less heavily on NU 
purchase to meet enriched uranium fuel demand. The lower the xw value, the 
more expensive NU would have to be in order to make that tails enrichment 
optimal. Steps and plateaus in the supply curve, which starts from (0,0) at lower 
left, indicate the marginal cost of the next unit of NU produced as a function of 
the NU price. It is important to note that since this model exactly satisfies the 
enriched U fuel requirements each year, with no option for utilities, enrichers, 
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producers and other market players to build up or draw down inventories or 
engage in speculation, the model cannot predict spot price excursions such as the 
one that took place at the end of the decade of the 2000 s. Instead, it is a tool for 
predicting longer-term price trends, especially in the face of policy decisions or 
changes in primary or secondary U or SWU supplies. 
 
 
Figure 22. Annual NU consumption. 
 
 
Figure 23. Annual SWU consumption. 
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Figure 24. Market clearing uranium price. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. SWU price. 
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11.1.3. Time delay and accumulated profit simple tests case 
Figures 28 and 29 represents in the previous section described test case with 
five U mines and P = 0.5, Q=0.7 coefficients, and 2.6% annual LEU fuel demand 
growth. In Figure 28 we see, that in 2018 low-cost mine D becomes available 
and is entered into production, causing the price of uranium to drop. U market 
price is below mine B’s long-term shutdown price therefore B leaves the 
market. Only after mine D is exhausted does it become feasible for B to again 
enter the market. Due to growing NU demand in 2025 U market price exceeds 
mine C’s short-run break-event point and C enters the market, which causes a 
price drop. 
Figure 26. The tails enrichment. 
 
Figure 27. Uranium market supply and demand curves in 2025. 
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We see that U mines are operating whenever U market price satisfies re-
quirements and can start operation instantly. Such conditions give smaller effect 
of U market price volatility as it can be seen in Figure 29. 
Figures 30 and 31 represents test scenario 1 from the Table 6 with activated 
time delay effect and profit accumulation function with the same data setup and 
P, Q coefficients. In the results we can see that in a year 2017 U mine A runs 
out of uranium and U mine C is opened. In 2018 U mine D is opened, because 
D is available for production and is cheaper compared to the C. That mean that 
mine C will be closed in year 2018, because NU market is filled with cheaper 
uranium. In the same year the NU market price falls to 65.3 $/kgU. Starting 
from year 2020 the mine D runs out of uranium and market price is growing. In 
a year 2022 U mine B is opened according to the configuration, which says that 
the bankrupted mines can be reopened only after five years. In year 2023 
uranium market price forecast exceeds 120 $/kgU and mine C is opened. 
Meanwhile the U enrichment industry reacts on the price change and in year 
2023 NU consumption decreases as well as U235 content of tails decreases. 
This reaction leads to U mine C being shut down on the same year. In a year 
2029 U market price is high enough and mine C is reopened and a year later 
closed because U production cannot cover production costs.  
Figure 28. Amount supplied per period Figure 29. Market clearing price 
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Figure 30. Amount supplied per period Figure 31. Market clearing price 
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The test scenario 2 from the Table 6 is presented in Figures 32 and 33. In this 
case U mines can be reopened 3 years after closure. Such scenario gives bigger 
price volatility as it can be seen in Figure 31. In Figure 32 we see that initial NU 
demand satisfies U mines A and E. In the year 2014 U mine B was opened and 
closed in the same year, which causes small U price drop. In 2017 mine A 
exhausted U reserves and mine C start production. But in 2018 low-cost mine D 
becomes available and is entered into production, causing the price of uranium 
to drop and mine C leave the market. In 2021 mine D exhausted U reserves and 
mine B start production, which cause U market price slow increment and B 
cannot cover U production costs therefore B leave the market in the same year. 
In a year 2022 we can see U market price peak, because model has mine start 
time delay, therefore mine C start production only in 2023. In the year 2025 
mine B start production and push out from the market mine C, because mine 
B’s U costs cheaper compare to mine C. Mine C tries to start production again 
in 2028. But as a result C causes U oversupply and U price drop therefore C 
leave the market. 
 
The previously described a real-world test cases are compared with the accumu-
lated profit regime switched on in scenarios 1 and 2. And with the accumulated 
profit calculation function on. Figures 34 and 35 represents the results from the 
first scenario and Figure 36 and 37 represents results from the second scenario. 
In Figure 39 we can see that market price is growing faster and accedes 
230 $/kgU. Meanwhile in the second case (Figure 37) when mines can be 
reopened after 3 years, price is not growing so fast and can be seen bigger price 
volatility.  
 
Figure 32. Amount supplied per period Figure 33. Amount supplied per period 
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11.1.4. Time delay and accumulated profit world case results 
The world case test conditions are described in the previous sections. With a 
mined-based market clearing model in which the time delay and profit 
accumulation functions are activated was tested such hypotheses. Firstly, we 
expected that the changes in the model would lead to reduction of supply and 
overall tougher conditions for uranium producers also reflected in higher market 
clearing price for uranium. Secondly, we expected the market price to be much 
more volatile.  
We can estimate the change to overall supply by calculating the economic 
value for each different scenario and time period and find the cumulative 
economic value for each scenario by summing the economic value across years. 
The Table 8 presents such summarized economic value for different scenarios 
where two parameters are analyzed for sensitivity. The length of the delay in 
restarting operations in years is presented in columns and the share of retained 
earnings is presented in rows.  
 
Figure 34. Market clearing price. Replica 
data.from the reference model. 
Figure 35. Market clearing price. 
Figure 36. Market clearing price. Replica 
data from the reference model. 
Figure 37. Market clearing price. 
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Table 8. Economic value calculation for each scenario 
Share of retained 
earnings / Year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 
10% 11 897 625 12 377 002 15 250 552 17 411 760 
20% 11 905 403 12 419 416 15 250 552 17 411 760 
30% 11 905 403 12 401 042 15 250 552 17 411 760 
40% 11 848 800 12 419 416 15 193 949 17 411 760 
50% 11 905 403 12 419 416 15 250 552 17 411 760 
70% 10 714 392 12 419 416 8 949 970 11 111 179 
90% 11 905 403 12 419 416 15 250 552 17 411 760 
 
As can be seen from the Table 8 for all scenarios the economic values are 
positive which means the prices in average are higher with a marketplace where 
decision making is delayed and the process for reopening a mine is time 
consuming. We see that the longer the delay, the higher the prices are in the 
market on average. This is because prices are more volatile and a lot more 
companies shut down their operations and reopen the mine with a delay causing 
larger fluctuations in the market. We also see that share of retained earnings 
does not have a significant effect on the economic value. We will separately 
analyze volatility by analyzing whether prices are more volatile. The results are 
illustrated in the Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Price volatility 
Share of retained 
earnings / Year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 
10 32.23* 31.80* 32.30* 33.30* 
20 32.24* 31.82* 32.31* 33.30* 
30 32.24* 31.81* 32.31* 33.30* 
40 32.20* 31.82* 32.27* 33.30* 
50 32.24* 31.82* 32.31* 33.30* 
70 24.89 31.82* 24.96 26.40 
90 32.24* 31.82* 32.31* 33.30* 
* standard deviation 
 
As can be seen from the Table 8 the standard deviations are much higher than in 
the case of base scenario where standard deviation is 23.05. The standard 
deviations are statistically significantly different from the base scenario with a 
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confidence level of 0.9. The Microsoft Excel was used in performing the F-test 
for comparison of variances. This means that introducing delay to the model has 
significantly increased the volatility of Uranium price. We also see that volatility 
increases with longer delay. The share of retained earnings at 70% was not sta-
tistically significant and difference in results requires further research. Gene-
rally, the results are similar and share of retained earnings is not a factor in price 
variance. We also see that share of retained earnings does not have a significant 
effect on the standard deviation of the price. 
Hence, we can confirm that the changes made in a main-based market clearing 
model resulted in higher market price and more volatile prices in general 
resulting in tougher conditions for miners to operate. This means that by reducing 
the time that is needed to reopen the mine one can increase efficiency on the 
market and make the market much more stable. This also results in overall 
lower prices and higher efficiency.   
 
 
11.2. An optimal NFC evaluation test  
The test case is created to demonstrate how VEGAS decision making model 
switches between different reactor technologies and nuclear fuel cycles as the 
equilibrium electricity cost changes over time. However the test case demon-
strates scenery with only includes two available reactor technologies, the model 
is capable of perform a switch between possible NFCs which is also easy to 
observe and simple to explain. The chosen test case simulates the USA nuclear 
reactor fleet and considers the possible adoption of fast spectrum reactors. In the 
test simulation only two reactor types where made available, but adding addi-
tional reactors to the simulation will not significantly impact performance. Such 
simplification was performed to easily verify results and algorithm correctness. 
Additional available reactor technologies might lead to many switching points 
and due to the system being rather inert and taking a while for the switch to 
become apparent because of the long operational life of the reactors, these points 
can become very hard to identify. Therefore, only two reactor technologies were 
used in the simulation to keep the results easy to analyze. 
The test case conditions are taken from autonomous dynamic decision making 
in a nuclear fuel cycle simulator. The test scenario approximates the current 
USA nuclear reactors fleet with capacity 100 GWe and is set to increases by 
0.8% every year (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010; U.S. Department of Energy, 
2012). Initially the capacity is made up entirely of “current fleet” reactors with 
their assumed parameters listed in Table 10. This fleet begins retiring in 2010 at 
a constant rate and is completely offline by 2030. This is a faster retirement than 
expected, but it permits a more rapid transition to next-generation reactors. As 
the reactors are decommissioned and unfulfilled capacity becomes available, the 
simulator chooses the currently cheapest equilibrium NFC when deciding which 
reactors to build. 
65 
The reactors available to the simulation are listed in Table 10. Advanced 
Pressurized Water Reactors (APWR-UOX) represent Generation III+ and LWRs 
and have been selected due to their high likelihood of being built in the USA. 
Sodium Cooled Fast Burner Reactors (SFR), were chosen because of their 
ability to recycle their own SNF and the relatively advanced state of maturity. 
Plutonium fueled tier 1 reactors were not used in order to keep the model as 
simple as possible. While the Technological Readiness Level (TRL) functiona-
lity has also been implemented, it was not used for the same reasons of keeping 
the model simple. 
Since the current fleet reactors are inferior to the APWR-UOX technology, 
they are only used for the beginning of the simulation, effectively leaving two 
options to choose from: the APWR-UOX only, and the APWR-UOX – SFR 
recycle scenarios. All reactors built during the simulation have a lifetime of 
60 years. 
 
Table 10. Nuclear reactor fuel cycle costs for the test case in 2009 US Dollars (Shrop-
shire et al., 2008) 
Service Price in USD 
U mining and milling $/kg(U3O8) 106 (initially) 
Conversion to UF6 $/kg(U3O8) 10 
Enrichment $/SWU* 155 
PWR fuel fabrication $/kgIHM 250 
Fresh fuel transportation $/kgIHM 50 
Reactor operation and maintenance $/kWh/y 68 
SNF storage $/kgIHM 300 
SNF transportation $/kgIHM 50 
Reprocessing $/kgIHM 1120 
SNF disposal $/kgIHM 500 
HLW vitrification $/kgIHM in HLW** 480 
HLW storage $/kgIHM in HLW 100 
HLW disposal $/kgIHM in HLW 1600 
APWR-UOX construction costs $/kWe overnight  3500 
SFR construction costs $/kWe overnight 3850 
* SWU – separative work unit. 
** HLW – high level radioactive waste 
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The financial discount rate was set to 7 % per year. The costs including taxes 
for various NFC services are listed in Table 10. Uranium mining and milling 
costs were the only ones to change with usage. The parameters used for these 
calculations were an initial reference amount of 600 000 tons in 2009, an 
approximation of the total amount of U that was required to fuel all the reactors 
in the USA up until this year, a growth exponent of 0.5 and an initial cost CrU of 
$106/kg. For purposes of calculating the NU price from equation 33, it is 
assumed that the uranium consumption rate in the rest of the world remains 
proportional to that of the USA. While the exponent value is rather large, it 
allows switching to an NFC with reprocessing on the basis of cost alone within 
the simulation time frame. 
 
 
11.2.1. NFC evaluation results 
The installed electricity generation capacity by technology type is shown in 
Figure 38. The black solid line represents the total demanded electricity gene-
ration capacity in GWe while the other colors represent the generation capacities 
from their respective reactors technology as listed in the legend. These sum to 
the total generation capacity. The current USA nuclear fleet reactors start 
retiring in 2010 and will finish in 2030. From the beginning the APWR-UOX 
only NFC is cheaper compare to SFR reactors, therefore all newly constructed 
reactors are APWR-UOX type. As illustrated in Figure 39, 1.93 million tons of 
uranium are used by the represented USA fleet (6.95 million tons around the 
world) over the 100-year simulation and by 2050 uranium price has increased 
from $106/kgU to $160/kgU. At this point reprocessing the spent fuel for use in 
SFRs becomes cheaper under the optimistic, illustrative SFR capital cost 
assumption shown in Table 10 and the model switches to the APWR-UOX – 
SFR NFC. Therefore, SFR type reactors begin appearing in the simulation out-
put. Because of limited capacity demand growth and slow APWR-UOX reactor 
retirements rate the SFR are slow to reach the equilibrium state. Only when the 
first APWR-UOX reactors built in 2010 started retire, then in 2070 does the 
transition speed increase for switching to SFR reactors and slowly approaching 
the equilibrium state by 2090.  
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Figure 38. Generation capacity results by reactor type. Technology switching begins at 
2050 followed by two transitional stages, the first due to limited total capacity growth 
and no decommissioned reactors and the second as APWR-UOX reactors are decom-
missioned. By 2090 the system approaches an equilibrium state. 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Natural uranium price and utilization 
 
The cost of electricity results of the simulation was plotted in Figure 40. The 
solid black curve represents the CoE of the test case simulation with dynamic 
switching. The solid grey curve and the dashed black curve plot the CoE of the 
two equilibrium NFCs calculated by the simulator. The decision to switch to the 
APWR – SFR NFC is made as the latter two lines cross in 2050. 
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Figure 40. Cost of electricity results for the test case. The solid black curve represents 
the actual results of the dynamic switching-enabled test case simulation and the other 
curves illustrate the CoE for their corresponding static simulations. 
 
As can be seen in the Figure 40, then the actual CoE calculated with the 
dynamic decision tool never match to equilibrium fuel cycle calculation with 
predefined user's input. For example, until 2050 the actual results calculated 
with the dynamic switch are lower than the APWR-UOX equilibrium results. 
Such calculation differences is due to the fact that discharged fuel in the case 
that transitions to SFRs is stored for decades prior to reprocessing, whereas it 
almost immediately pays a disposal cost in the APWR-UOX case. As the actual 
spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is not performed until fuel is required for SFRs, 
the fuel reprocessing costs are effectively reduced due to the 7% financial 
discount rate. This would require a more appropriate financial model that would 
discount back-end costs like reprocessing and disposal at a lower rate and this 
effect would be less significant factor to the cost of electricity. In the case of a 
constant equilibrium state of APWR-UOX and SFR reactors which start from 
2090 full reprocessing costs are covered shortly after spent fuel is discharged, 
and the simulation output will converge with the APWR – SFR equilibrium 
CoE as fuel interim storage costs diminish. From the results it is clear that 
needed additional time to switch between technologies and fuel cycles.  
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12. CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis is focused on NFC numerical modelling and advanced approach 
testing in an existing models. An agent-based modelling concept was imple-
mented and tested in a uranium market clearing model. An autonomous dynamic 
decision making approach was tested in the VEGAS NFC model. The work 
conducted within this study is summarized in next points: 
1. A mine-based uranium market clearing model demonstrates an approach to 
model the behavior of autonomous entities – uranium mines, within a simu-
lation of part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Such approach allows creating an 
advanced, more realistic stochastic model in which entities act indepen-
dently, focusing only on profit maximization. Based upon their unique char-
acteristics, the entities uranium mines made yearly decisions to commence or 
continue production, or alternatively to enter into short-term or permanent 
shutdown. The decisions were based upon the economic theory of individual 
firms with unique supply curves participating in a competitive market. Indi-
vidual startup and permanent shutdown decisions were myopic in the sense 
that they took into account only the state of the market in the year they were 
taken. Therefore, a rollback algorithm was implemented if a mine was found 
to enter a permanent shutdown condition before it had produced all of its 
reserves. This algorithm returns the simulation to the year in which the mine 
was opened and undoes the decision. In that sense, the rollback algorithm 
replicates firms’ ability to project future market behavior when weighing the 
costs and benefits of entering an industry. The thesis leads to a methodology 
governing decision-making entities inside a nuclear fuel cycle simulator. A 
similar algorithm can be envisioned to drive the construction of other fuel 
cycle facilities as well as power reactors. But it can generalize to entities 
whose objective is other than maximization of profit. For instance, the 
decision to construct reactors whose purpose is to burn down transuranic 
elements may not be driven only by economic considerations. Yet these 
reactors face a condition similar to the one that led to the rollback algorithm 
that was demonstrated in this paper for uranium mines. A mine, initially 
profitable, might later become unprofitable so that its owner would have 
been better off never having opened it in the first place. Similarly, a trans-
muter reactor that might have an adequate supply of transuranic fuel at the 
time it was constructed could face in absence of fuel later on. Within the 
environment of the fuel cycle simulator, one way to tell whether unfavorable 
conditions of either type will arise the only way if the simulator is highly 
complex or nonlinear is to run the simulation clock forward. In both cases, 
the rollback strategy resolves the unfavorable condition, although it must be 
noted that this alone does not guarantee that the final outcome of the simu-
lation is in any sense optimal. Nonetheless, the approach represents a step 
toward autonomous decision making within nuclear energy system models. 
2. Improved decision-making strategy with time delay and profit accumulation 
function of an individual U mine gives more flexibility to model the dif-
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ferent regulators conditions. In it important to note, that the model does not 
assume that regulations might differ in each country or region, but such 
scenery can also be simulated. The results show that the improvements made 
to the model made the conditions much tougher for miners to operate in, 
causing the prices in the market to increase on average. It is also possible to 
confirm that the improvements also increased volatility. However, the impact 
of retained earnings proved to be insignificant and did not have a significant 
effect on the economic value of the scenarios. This means that even if all the 
profits are retained, the price changes are significant enough to wipe out all 
profits in a short period of time. We found that delay in decision making is 
very significant. Hence, we can conclude that the longer it takes for miners 
to reopen their mines the greater inefficiency this creates, leading to higher 
prices and more volatility in the market. Better regulations can reduce the time 
that is needed to reopen mines, whether it is related to a more efficient 
licensing procedure, more flexible labor laws or other relevant regulations. If 
the regulator of the market was able to create an environment where miners 
can quickly exit and re-enter the market then this would lead to market 
efficiency, lower average prices and more stable prices.  
3. The autonomous decision-making tool test case shown that the simulator is 
able to issue dynamic reactor building orders for different equilibrium fuel 
cycles, which is based on NFC economic characteristic and uranium price 
dynamic. The possibility of NFC simulator to issue autonomous building 
decisions based on performance metric has been demonstrated. In this parti-
cular case was demonstrated approach of issuing building order based on the 
costs of electricity minimization. However the current test case only 
included 2 types of reactors, the list could be expanded to include many 
possible reactor types. The extended version of VEGAS simulator could be a 
useful tool for quickly determining the feasibility and costs of various NFCs. 
In addition such simulation approach could be applied to a more complex 
NFC simulator. The work can be used to support more complicated NFC 
simulations where user’s defined build order might not guaranty the best 
results. The simulator is capable to issue reactor technology deployment 
orders in the ratio of the targeted least-cost NFC. The model could achieve 
quicker convergence in the target NFC if the build order “overshoots” the 
target, e.g. by constructing a greater-than-equilibrium share of high-tier 
reactors until the equilibrium ratio is reached or even surpassed. The simu-
lator can violate material balance constraints by deploying extra reactors. To 
solve this problem VEGAS take the computationally expensive step of rolling 
back in time and reissuing build orders. The current simulation approach 
uses present value costs analysis within the decision metric. But in a real life 
technology deployment decisions are taken on the basis of current and 
discounted future costs. In order to make model more precise the CoE metric 
would need to include a time-dependent U price forecast. The improved 
decision metric would condition each year's build decisions on the expected 
discounted CoE over the new reactors’ lifetime. 
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SUPPLEMENTS  
Table S1. Secondary sources 
Name 
Amount 
(tonnes U 
or Pu*)
Enrichment 
(wt% 235U) 
Maximum 
annual rate 
(tonnes/yr)
Year 
avail-
able 
Cate-
gory 
Purchase Agreement HEU 100 90 25 2010 HEU 
Surplus HEU 417.1 90 13.9 2014 HEU 
Surplus WGPu 68 N/A 3.4 2020 Pu 
DU-enrichment step A 291,432 0.19 14,572 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step B 322,804 0.24 16,140 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step C 226,025 0.29 11,301 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step D 254,303 0.34 12,715 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step E 40,147 0.39 2,007 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step F 27,379 0.44 1,369 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step G 1,103 0.49 55 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step H 3,023 0.54 151 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step I 244 0.59 12 2010 DU 
DU enrichment step J 591 0.64 30 2010 DU 
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SUMMARY 
Development of computational model for nuclear  
energy systems analysis: natural resources optimisation  
and radiological impact minimization 
Many countries are struggling to limit greenhouse gas emissions and focus on 
carbon-free energy sources, and therefore nuclear energy is a subject of con-
tinuing debate to enhance the worldwide energy production mix and cover the 
base load requirements. Evaluation of uranium supply in a market and resource 
optimization context is needed to inform decisions impacting the long-term 
development of nuclear power and warn policy makers about possible uranium 
market supply-side volatilities and to help choose the technology mix. The aim 
of this work is to demonstrate and test advanced simulation methods and con-
ceptual ideas to enable realistic fuel cycle simulators and develop a supporting 
tool for decision makers. Additionally, this work facilitates the selection of the 
most favorable nuclear fuel cycle, using optimization with respect to multiple 
criteria save natural resources, minimize the impact of high level radioactive 
waste on nature, to and decrease nuclear material proliferation risks.  
Below are explained several separate tasks and stages which have been 
addressed during this study: 
1) The nuclear fuel cycle is a complex system with a series of industrial pro-
cesses involving the production of electricity from uranium, plutonium and 
other fissile materials in nuclear power reactors. The first part of the work is 
focused on the front-end nuclear fuel cycle which includes uranium mining 
and milling, enrichment services and nuclear reactors. Nuclear reactors are 
designed to run on a specific nuclear fuel, which cannot be substituted in a 
short period and any change requires large investment. Therefore, fuel re-
quirements must be satisfied in the short run. 
2) Nuclear fuel cycle numerical models are intended to simulate the evolution of 
cycles over a period of time and then to provide output data relevant to the 
input parameters. Currently there are several nuclear fuel cycle simulation 
codes available, but usually simulators are designed only for one specific 
target. Nearly all nuclear fuel cycle simulation codes can be divided into two 
groups – codes which track material movement in discrete fuel batches and 
codes which do not. Nuclear fuel cycle simulation tools can easily become 
complex, and any new simulation can require significant effort as well data 
analysis. There are situations where validation can become almost impos-
sible. Most previous simulation tools work on arbitrary data and simulate 
only a possible event horizon but do not predict prices, costs or other eco-
nomic criteria. 
3) In this work, a mine-based uranium market clearing model is built upon data-
bases of primary and secondary uranium resources as well as enrichment 
facilities. The model derives market-clearing conditions by locating the inter-
sections between the annual supply and demand curves, also considering the 
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effects of secondary supplies including highly enriched uranium down-blen-
ding and the sale of natural uranium inventories. Therefore, the model incor-
porates the coupling between the uranium and enrichment markets. Each 
uranium mine in the core database has unique characteristics including total 
uranium reserves, earliest feasible opening date, capital and operating costs, 
and other parameters which are fixed. These parameters are the same in 
every time period, as long as the mine still possesses the uranium reserves it 
can produce. The uranium mine production decisions of each mine are 
determined based on the short-run market price. To make operational de-
cisions based on the short-run market price, the model uses representative 
mine cost structure and assumes the same relative distribution of capital, 
operating, and decommissioning costs. Hence these costs are obtained by 
scaling the costs for the reference mine by the ratio of unit costs. The short 
run market supply curve is defined as the horizontal sum of the individual 
mines’ supply curves. The demand curve creation mechanism involves 
finding the natural uranium price for which each tails weight fraction would 
be cost-minimizing when natural uranium and conversion costs are all 
incorporated. 
4) The agent-based modelling concept is widely used in energy systems model-
ling and other fields to model individual agents’ behavior in an ecosystem 
where each agent solves an optimization task and makes individual decisions. 
A mine-based uranium market clearing model uses a cycle type agent-based 
modelling approach. An individual agent can represent a large uranium 
mine, which has significant effect on the uranium market share. Therefore, 
such agents have a weight fraction on the natural uranium market and indi-
vidual decisions can affect market price. During each year of the simulation, 
the market clearing model uses decision tree criteria to determine whether 
each mine will operate. It then must decide how much uranium the mine will 
contribute to the total amount supplied across the industry. The model has 
built-in profit accumulation and time delay functions to make the model 
more realistic and volatile to external factors – such as mining policy changes 
and natural disasters. 
5) By default, a mine-based uranium market clearing model does not take into 
account uranium mine licensing issues and other operational activities, 
allowing for new mines to open, reopen or shut down instantly. The time 
which is needed to reopen the mine is closely related to the economic and 
regulative environment and often is not solely dependent on the producer’s 
decision. The time delay will reduce the supply, since uranium producers 
will enter the market more slowly when the conditions are favorable. This 
will make the market much more volatile and resemble the actual market 
behavior more realistically. When new producers enter the market the supply 
curve shifts to the right and price decreases. When individual mines go 
bankrupt, the supply curve starts shifting to the left (slowly), but if there are 
enough producers operating in loss, the number of bankruptcies increases 
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suddenly and the supply curve makes a sudden shift to the left, causing price 
to increase suddenly. 
6) The VEGAS – a nuclear fuel cycle and economy simulation tool, which 
verifies optimal nuclear fuel cycle is based on the expected cost of electri-
city as the simulation driving factor. A key capability is to select which type 
of reactor to build based upon objective criteria. Optimization based upon 
cost ideally includes a degree of foresight. True mathematical optimization 
would require complete foresight, but that is arguably not a realistic 
depiction of how agents make decisions. In the VEGAS nuclear fuel cycle 
simulator, decisions are made on the basis of the costs of electricity 
minimising equilibrium fuel cycle. An equilibrium fuel cycle can be defined 
for any combination of reactor types and represents a state in which at least 
one hard material balance constraint is met. It is characterized by a specific 
deployment ratio of the member types. There are many nuclear reactor 
technologies already available and even more are likely to become available 
in the future, so even the task of finding the equilibrium is challenging, if 
many of the technologies are made available to the simulation. 
 
Main highlights of this work include development of a mine-based uranium 
market clearing model, which demonstrates an approach to model the behavior 
of autonomous entities – uranium mines. Furthermore, an important achieve-
ment is the autonomous decision making tool, which illustrates that the model is 
capable of dynamically issuing building orders for different equilibrium fuel 
cycles, based on fuel cycle economics and uranium price evolution. 
 
  
 SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Loodussäästliku tuumkütuse tsükli modelleerimine ja  
analüüs optimaalseks tooraine kasutuseks ja  
radioloogilise mõju vähendamiseks  
Paljud riigid püüavad piirata kasvuhoonegaaside heitkoguseid ja püüavad 
keskenduda süsinikuvabadele energiaallikatele, mistõttu on tuumaenergia 
jätkuva arutelu teema, et laiendada kogu maailma energiatootmise segmenti ja 
katta baaskoormuse nõudeid. On vaja hinnangut turul pakutavatele uraanitarne-
tele ja vastavat ressursside optimeerimise konteksti, tegemaks otsuseid, mis 
mõjutavad tuumaenergia pikaajalist arengut, ning hoiatab poliitikakujundajaid 
võimalikest uraaniturul toimuvatest muutustest, et aidata teha tehnoloogilisi 
valikuid. Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on demonstreerida ja katsetada arenenud 
simulatsioonimeetodeid ja kontseptsioone, et luua realistlikumaid kütusetsüklite 
simulaatoreid ja seeläbi luua otsusetegijatele vajalik abivahend. Lisaks lahendab 
töö optimeerimisparadigma, leidmaks soodsaima tuumakütusetsükli tehno-
loogia, mis aitab säästa loodusvarasid, suudab minimiseerida kõrgetasemelist 
radioaktiivsete jäätmete mõju loodusele ja vähendades tuumamaterjalide levi-
kust tulenevat ohtu.  
Selgitame järgnevalt eri ülesandeid ja probleemipüstitusi, et näidata vajadust 
täiustatud simulatsioonilähenemisviiside järele: 
1) Tuumkütusetsükkel on kompleksne tööstusprotsesside järgnevuste süsteem, 
koosnedes mitmest etapist eesmärgiga toota elektrienergiat uraani, plutoo-
niumi ja muude lõhustuvate materjalide lõhustamisel tuumareaktorites. Töö 
esimene osa on pühendatud tuumkütuse esimesele tsüklile, mis hõlmab uraani 
kaevandamist ja freesimist, rikastamisteenuseid ja tuumareaktoreid. Tuuma-
reaktorid on loodud töötama teatud konkreetse tuumkütusega, mida ei saa 
lühikese aja jooksul asendada ning mistahes muudatusteks on vaja suuri 
investeeringuid. Seetõttu tuleb esmatähtsalt rahuldada vajadus etteantud 
tuumakütuse järele. 
2) Tuumkütuse tsükli arvutuslike mudelite eesmärgiks on modelleerida eri tsük-
lite arengut mingi ajaperioodi jooksul, et seejärel genereerida relevantseid 
väljundandmeid vastavalt etteantud sisendparameetritele. Hetkel leidub 
mitmeid tuumkütuse tsükli modelleerimise simulatsiooniprogramme, kuid 
tavaliselt on need simulaatorid kavandatud vaid ühe konkreetse eesmärgi 
jaoks. Peaaegu kõik tuumkütusetsükli simulatsiooniprogrammid võib jagada 
kahte rühma – programmid, mis järgivad materjali liikumist diskreetsete 
kütusekogustena ja teised, mis seda ei tee. Tuumkütusetsükli simulatsiooni-
tööriistad võivad kergesti muutuda keerukaks ja iga uus simulatsioon võib 
tähendada märkimisväärset jõupingutust kui ka andmeanalüüsi, samas kui 
tulemuste valideerimine võib osutuda peaaegu võimatuks. Enamus simu-
latsioonitööriistu töötavad suvaliste andmete korral ja modelleerivad vaid 
võimalikke sündmuste väljavaateid, kuid ei prognoosi hindu, kulusid ega 
muid majanduslikke kriteeriume. 
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3) Kaevanduspõhine uraaniturgude arveldusmudel põhineb esmaste ja sekun-
daarsete uraaniressursside andmebaasidel ning rikastamisrajatistel. Mudel 
näitab turgude arveldustingimusi, leides iga-aastase pakkumise ja nõudluse 
kõverate vahelisi seoseid, võttes arvesse ka sekundaarse tarne tagajärgi, seal-
hulgas kõrgrikastatud uraani segusid kui ka looduslike uraanivarude kogu-
seid. Tänu sellele hõlmab mudel uraani ja rikastamiseturgude ühismõjusid. 
Iga uraanikaevanduse kohta on tuumik-andmebaasis unikaalsed karakteris-
tikud, sealhulgas uraanivarude koguhulk, vareseim võimalik avamise kuu-
päev, kapitali- ja tegevuskulud ning muud fikseeritud parameetrid, mis ajas 
ei muutu, eeldusel et kaevandusel on veel uraanivarusid mida toota. Uraani 
tootmise otsused tehakse iga kaevanduse puhul lähtuvalt hetke turuhinnast. 
Operatiivsete otsuste tegemiseks lähtuvalt lühiajalisest turuhinna prognoosist 
kasutab mudel kaevanduskulude tüüpstruktuuri eeldades sarnast kapitali, 
käitus- ja sulgemiskulude suhtelist jaotumist. Tänu sellele saadakse antud 
kulud skaleerides tüüpkaevanduse vastavad näitajad ühikuhindadega ette-
antud kaevanduses. Lühiajalise turupakkumise kõver on defineeritud kui 
üksikute kaevanduste pakkumiskõverate horisontaalne summa. Nõudluse 
kõvera loomise mehhanism hõlmab loodusliku uraani hinna leidmist, mille 
puhul iga fragmendi osakaal oleks minimaalne, kaasates nii loodusliku 
uraanimaagi kui ka selle ümbertöötlemise kulud. 
4) Agendipõhine modelleerimise kontseptsioon on laialdaselt kasutusel energia-
süsteemide modelleerimisel kui ka teistes valdkondades, et modelleerida 
üksikute agentide käitumist ökosüsteemis, kus iga agent lahendab optimeeri-
misülesande ja teeb iseseisvaid otsuseid. Kaevandustel põhinev uraani turu-
mudel kasutab tsükli-tüüpi agendipõhist modelleerimisviisi. Üksikagent võib 
esindada suurt uraanikaevandust, mis mõjutab märkimisväärselt uraani turu-
osa. Seetõttu on sellistel agentidel kaalukas osa loodusliku uraani turul ja 
individuaalsed otsused võivad mõjutada turuhinda. Simulatsiooni iga aasta 
kohta kasutab turukontrollimudel teatud otsustuspuu kriteeriume, et määrata 
kindlaks, kas iga konkreetne kaevandus töötab või mitte. Sellele järgneb 
otsus, kui palju uraani antud kaevandus turule panustab kogu tööstusharu 
lõikes. Lisaks on mudelisse sisse ehitatud kasumi akumulatsiooni ja ajata-
mise funktsioon, et muuta mudel realistlikumaks ja volatiilsemaks sõltuvalt 
välistest teguritest – nagu näiteks kaevanduspoliitika muudatused, võima-
likud loodusõnnetused jne. 
5) Vaikimisi ei võeta kaevanduspõhise uraaniturgude arveldamise mudelil 
arvesse uraanikaevanduste litsentsimisega seotud küsimusi ega muid kaas-
nevaid toiminguid, mis võimaldavad uute kaevanduste avamist, taasavamist 
või viivitamatut sulgemist. Kaevanduse taasavamiseks vajalik aeg on tihe-
dalt seotud majandusliku ja regulatiivse keskkonnaga ning see ei sõltu ainult 
tootja otsusest. Selline viivitus vähendab pakkumist, kuna uraanitootjad sise-
nevad turule soodsamate tingimuste tekkimisel alles teatud viivisega. See 
muudab turu tunduvalt muutlikumaks ja sarnasemaks tegelike turgude 
käitumisele. Kui turule sisenevad uued tootjad, kaldub pakkumise kõver 
paremale ja toimub hinnalangus. Kui üksikud kaevandused pankrotistuvad, 
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hakkab pakkumiskõver pöörduma (aeglaselt) vasakule, kuid kui on palju 
kahjumis tootjeid, kasvab järsult ka pankrottide arv ning pakkumiskõver 
teeb suure nihke vasakule, mille tagajärjeks on järsk hinnnatõus. 
6)  VEGAS – tuumkütuse tsükli ja majanduslike faktorite modelleerimistööriist, 
mis teeb kindlaks optimaalse tuumkütusetsükli põhialused lähtuvalt simult-
siooni juhtivast tegurist – elektrienergia oodatavast maksumusest. Võtme-
omaduseks on võime teha valikut, mis tüüpi reaktorit ehitada lähtuvalt 
objektiivsetest kriteeriumitest. Kulupõhine optimeerimine sisaldab ideaal-
juhul ka tulevikuvaadet. Puhtmatemaatiline optimeerimine eeldaks täielikku 
ennustust, kuid see ei ole tõenäoliselt realistlik kirjeldus agentidele otsuste-
tegemiseks. VEGAS-e tuumkütusetsükli simulaatoris tehakse otsuseid elektri-
energia kulude põhjal, minimiseerides tasakaalu-kütusetsüklit. Reaktori-
tüüpide mis tahes kombinatsiooni jaoks saab määrata tasakaalu-kütusetsükli, 
mis kujutab endast olukorda, kus täidetud vähemalt üks tugevatest materjali 
tasakaalu piirangutest. Seda iseloomustab spetsiifiline liikmestüüpide kasu-
tussuhe. Praeguseks juba eksisteerib mitmeid erinevaid tuumareaktoritehno-
loogiaid ja tõenäoliselt lisandub neid tulevikus veelgi, mistõttu isegi tasa-
kaalu leidmise ülesanne osutub parajaks väljakutseks modelleerimisel, kui 
kasutusele võetakse palju erinevaid tehnoloogiaid. 
 
Kaevanduspõhine uraaniturgude arveldusmudel demonstreerib lähenemisviisi, 
kus modelleeritakse uuraanikaevandusi autonoomselt käituvate üksustena. 
Autonoomne otsustusvahend näitab, et mudel suudab dünaamiliselt väljastada 
ehitustellimusi erinevate kütuseahela tasakaalude korral, mis põhinevad kütuse-
tsükli ökonoomikal ja uraanihindade arengudünaamikal. 
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